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PATHS TO PROTECTION: A COMPARISON OF FEDERAL




Over the past three decades, social movements in both the
disability community and in the lesbian and gay community have
taken a foothold in American society.' Activists in these two com-
munities have raised awareness about the inequalities and
discrimination that their members face. As a result, lawmakers in
many jurisdictions, from local councils to the United States
Congress, have enacted statutory protections for these two groups.
This Article focuses on federal protections based on disability and
sexual orientation by comparing and contrasting the protections
accorded these two groups by the federal government.
Although these two groups may seem different and incompara-
ble at first glance, the history of discrimination and oppression
suffered by both groups is quite similar. Both groups have been
systematically vilified and isolated from the mainstream of
American society.' Both groups have been victims of violence based
purely on their status as lesbians and gay men or as persons with
disabilities.'
Part II briefly describes equal protection jurisprudence, which
is the focus of this Article's analysis. This part explains the three
levels of judicial scrutiny utilized in equal protection cases and
discusses these levels vis-&-vis disability and sexual orientation.
* Law clerk, Hon. Roxanne Bailin, Chief Judge, 20th Judicial District of Colorado,
1999-2000; J.D., summa cum laude, Washington College of Law, American University, 1999;
BA., cum laude, Hamilton College, 1993. The author would like to thank Robert Dinerstein,
Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, for his insights, guidance,
and encouragement on this Article. This Article is dedicated to the memory of my
grandfather, Henry Courtenay, who passed on his vision of social justice to me and who
always supported my participation in the fight for social justice and equality.
1. Throughout the Article, I will refer to those in the disability community as "persons
with disabilitiese while I will refer to those in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered
community as "lesbians and gay men.' I realize that these categories necessarily erase the
diversity within the two communities, as well as the overlap between the two communities.
My categorizations, however, are for the purposes of analyzing and comparing the treatment
of these two groups on the federal level and are not meant to reflect any assumptions that
the communities are homogeneous or mutually exclusive.
2. See infra Parts III and IV.
3. See id.
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Parts III and IV then explore the history of the treatment of
both of these marginalized groups, including the parallels in the
legal developments and where federal protections diverge.
Although there are many similarities in the way these groups are
viewed by society, and in turn treated by different legislatures,
there are some very important differences in how the groups are
perceived and treated. Parts III and IV also discuss the current
legal trends in each of these areas with a focus on the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)' and the Employment Non-Discrimina-
tion Act of 1997 (ENDA) as points of divergence of the legal
protection afforded these groups.
Using these two pieces of legislation as points of reference for
the divergence of federal protection for these two groups, Part V
analyzes possible reasons for such divergence. Part V explores the
possibility of persons with disabilities and lesbians and gay men
gaining heightened scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause
analysis. This Part recommends that lesbians and gay men receive
suspect classification, while recommending that persons with
disabilities receive quasi-suspect classification. Part VI concludes
with a discussion about the probability of such classifications, given
the constitution of the current United States Supreme Court.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." The Equal Protection Clause seeks to ensure that
legislation based on different kinds of classifications does not
violate the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court has
said, however, that"[tihe Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws must coexist
with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one
purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). The ADA provides persons with disabilities, for the
first time in American history, equal opportunity in employment, public accommodation,
state and local government services, transportation, and telecommunications. See id. See
generally Lisa A. Montanaro, Comment, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Will the Court
Get the Hint? Congress' Attempt to Raise the Status of Persona with Disabilities in Equal
Protection Cases, 15 PACE L. REV. 621 (1995) (describing the ADA, its history, and
implications).
5. S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. (1997).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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or persons."7 In essence, the Supreme Court has held that the equal
protection guarantee provides that similarly situated individuals or
groups will be treated equally by the law.' Further, any classifica-
tion that arbitrarily burdens one group vis-a-vis a similarly situated
group is constitutionally infirm.9
-The Constitution has empowered the United States Congress
to. enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection, 0 but because Congress has never promulgated any
standards or regulations controlling equal protection inquiries, the
Supreme Court has developed a three-tiered analytic model to
address these inquiries.' The-three standards of review in equal
protection cases are rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny
review, and strict scrutiny review.1 2
Rational basis review is the lowest constitutional threshold
that a law must meet.'" Under this standard, legislation is
presumed constitutional if the classification employed by the law is
"rationally related to a legitimate state interest." 4 The Court
previously has stated that. a legitimate state interest and a
classification are rationally related when "any set of facts reason-
ably can be conceived that would sustain it.""l
The intermediate scrutiny standard of review is applied when
a quasi-suspect classification is implicated.'x  Intermediate
7. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
8. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
9. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
11. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-43 (1985)
(reviewing the history of equal protection jurisprudence and describing the three levels of
judicial scrutiny). Some scholars and courts insist, however, that Congress did in fact
provide guidance to courts and legislated that persons with disabilities constitute a suspect
class, in the ADA's findings, which stated that persons with disabilities are a "discrete and
insular minority.* See Montanaro, supra note 4,passim (discussing standard of review and
whether the disabled should be considered a suspect class). See generally Note, Section 5 and
the Protection of Nonsuspect Classes After City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1642
(1998) [hereinafter Nonauspect Classes] (discussing Congress's ability to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in legislation protecting non-suspect classes); Elizabeth Welter, Note,
The ADA's Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment State Immunity as a Valid Exercise of
Congress's Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1139 (1998)
(discussing the ADA's abrogation of state sovereign immunity with respect to legislation
affecting the disabled as a non-suspect class).
12. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432, 439-43.
13. See id. at 440.
14. I&
15. Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
16. A"quasi-suspect" class is one whose members share some characteristics of a suspect
group, yet do not qualify as a "discrete and insular minority.' Presently, only classifications
based on gender and legitimacy have been accorded quasi-suspect status. See Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1976) (holding that illegitimacy-based classifications demand
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scrutiny, also known as heightened scrutiny, requires that the
quasi-suspect classification be substantially related to an important
government interest.17
Finally, the strict scrutiny standard of review is the most
difficult for a law to survive. This standard involves no deference
to the legislature or electorate; instead, the judiciary undertakes an
independent review of the law in question.18 Strict scrutiny is
triggered in two circumstances: when a fundamental right is
implicated in the law or when the classification involved is deemed
suspect."' The Court has determined that classifications based on
race, alienage, and nationality are per se suspect."0 In order for a
law to survive strict scrutiny, it must be "suitably tailored to serve
a compelling state interest."1 -The Court has created new funda-
mental rights and new suspect and quasi-suspect classes very
sparingly and infrequently; it has been a very long time since a new
fundamental right triggered strict scrutiny review.22
Although the Court has never articulated a precise test for
determining when a group rises to the level of a quasi-suspect or
suspect class, it has expressed factors to consider in defining a
quasi-suspect or suspect class. These factors include: whether the
group's defining characteristic is immutable;' whether the group
has suffered a history of discrimination;2 whether the group is in
a position of political powerlessness; 25 whether the group's defining
characteristic relates in any way to the individual's ability to
participate in, and contribute to, society;2s and whether the
heightened scrutiny); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,682 (1972) (holding that gender-
based classifications demand heightened scrutiny); see also Raffi S. Baroutian, Note, The
Advent ofthe Multifactor, Sliding-Scale Standard of Equal Protection Review: Out with the
Traditional Three-Tier Method of Analysis, in with Romer v. Evans, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1277, 1292-93 (1997) (discussing the Supreme Court's apparent transition from the
traditional three-tier approach to equal protection to a multi-factor, sliding scale approach
in Romer v. Evans).
17. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
18. See id. at 440-41.
19. See id. at 440.
20. See id.; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,372 (1971) (holding that alienage-based
classifications demand strict scrutiny); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964)
(holding that race-based classifications demand strict scrutiny).
21. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
22. The lastquasi-suspect classification articulated by the Courtwas illegitimacyin 1976.
See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1976).
23. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). But see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
442-43 n.10 (revealing some hesitancy about applying the immutability factor).
24. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 313-14 (1976); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-85.
25. See San Antonio Indep. Sh. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
26. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-44 (quoting Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505).
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characteristic is beyond the control of the individual group
member. 7
As evidenced by this three-tiered system of analysis, the higher
the level of scrutiny employed by a court in submitting it to an
equal protection review, the more likely that the law will fail
constitutional muster. The application of the rational basis test is
almost never fatal to the legislation under review. 2 Conversely, the
application of the strict scrutiny test is almost always fatal to the
legislation under review, although the Court has upheld statutes on
rare occasions.' As a result, groups, such as persons with disabili-
ties and lesbians and gay men, will gain an advantage if classified
as a quasi-suspect or suspect class. As discussed below, persons
with disabilities and lesbians and gay men, as classes, rarely have
been granted quasi-suspect or suspect classification, although there
are strong arguments that each of these two groups should be
accorded at least quasi-suspect classification.
III. DIsABILITY AND THE LAw: HISTORY AND CURRENT TRENDS
A. Discrimination and Oppression of Persons with Disabilities
The disabled community historically has endured discrimina-
tion and inequality. Persons with disabilities have been institution-
alized and imprisoned against their will, isolated from their
communities, and abused by purported caretakers. 0 Even the
United States Supreme Court has recognized the historical and
present oppression of persons with disabilities. In its seminal case
to date on the issue of disability and equal protection, City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,31 the Court addressed the City
of Cleburne's denial of a zoning permit to a group home for mentally
retarded individuals. 2 The Court specifically rejected quasi-suspect
classification for persons with disabilities, considering the case
27. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
28. See, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 317 (upholding a mandatory retirement age ordinance
under a rational review analysis). But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996)
(striking down a state constitutional amendment under the rational basis test); Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 450 (striking down an ordinance under the rational basis test).
29. See, e.g., Koremateu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 221-24 (1944) (upholding an
exclusion order based on ethnicity/ancestry under the 'most rigid scrutiny").
30. See Montanaro, supra note 4, at 636 (describing the discrimination and mistreatment
of persons with disabilities throughout American history).
31. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
32. See id. at 435.
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under rational review.' The Cleburne Court stated, "[t]he short of
it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on
an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded."' In his
concurrence with the Cleburne majority, Justice Stevens added,
"the Court of Appeals correctly observed that through ignorance
and prejudice the mentally retarded 'have been subjected to a
history of unfair and often grotesque mistreatment.'"35 In the
opinion's strongest language about the plight of the mentally
retarded, Justice Marshall wrote in his dissent:
mhe mentally retarded have been subject to a "lengthy and
tragic history" of segregation and discrimination that can only
be called grotesque. During much of the 19th century, mental
retardation was viewed as neither curable nor dangerous and,
the retarded were largely left to their own devices. By the latter
part of the century and during the first decades of the new one,
however, .... leading medical authorities and others began to
portray the "feebleminded" as a "menace to society and civiliza-
tion... responsible in a large degree for many, if not all, of our
social problems." A regime of state-mandated segregation and
degradation soon emerged .... Massive custodial institutions
were built to warehouse the retarded for life .... Retarded
children were categorically excluded from public schools, based
on the false stereotype that all were ineducable .... State laws
deemed the retarded "unfit for citizenship."'
In addition, the United States Congress has recognized the
history of discrimination against persons with disabilities. In its
findings accompanying the ADA, Congress declared that discrimi-
nation against persons with disabilities continues today. Congress
found that this discrimination occurs in many areas of life,
including housing, employment, voting, and public accommodations
and that this discrimination is the result of many factors, including
"outright intentional exclusion"" as well as "overprotective rules s3B
and "exclusionary qualification standards."" The congressional
findings further state that persons with disabilities "occupy an
inferior status in our society"' and constitute a "discrete and
33. See iU at 442.
34. Id at 460.
35. Id. at 446 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
36. Id at 461-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(aX5) (1994).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 12101(a)(6).
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insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and
limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
and regulated to a position of political powerlessness."" Congress
concluded that persons with disabilities, while facing "the continu-
ing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and preju-
dice,"'2 have "often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimina-
tion.
B. Pre-ADA Federal Laws Protecting Persons with Disabilities
The ADA is the most recent and most comprehensive federal
law protecting persons with disabilities. Legislative attempts to
protect persons with disabilities began, however, long before the
ADA. As early as 1918, Congress passed the Vocational Rehabilita-
tion Act,' which provided persons with disabilities discharged from
the armed services with vocational rehabilitation in order to
prepare them to return to civil employment."5 Next, in 1920,
Congress passed another Vocational Rehabilitation Act," which set
out to promote vocational rehabilitation for persons with disabilities
who sustained their disability in the course of employment."7 In
1936, the Randolph-Sheppard Vending Act" was passed and
assisted the blind in finding employment."9 In 1968, Congress
passed the Architectural Barriers Act," which required all new
facilities built with public money to be accessible to persons with
disabilities.5' Further, Congress passed the Developmental
Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Amendments of
1970,52 which granted federal monies to community-based living
facilities established for persons with developmental disabilities.s
41. I § 12101(aX7).
42. Id. § 12101(aX9).
43. Id. § 12101(aX4).
44. Ch. 107, 40 Stat. 617 (1918); see also Montanaro, supra note 4, at 637 (describing the
history of pre-ADA federal legislation based on disability). In 1943 and 1954, Congress
enacted amendments to the Vocational Rehabilitation Act that funded medical and
rehabilitative services. See id.
45. See Montanaro, supra note 4, at 657.
46. Ch. 219, 41 Stat. 735 (1920) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994).
47. See Montanaro, supra note 4, at 637.
48. Ch. 638, 49 Stat. 1559 (1936) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 107 (1999)).
49. See Montanaro, supra note 4, at 637.
50. Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-
4156 (1999)).
51. See Montanaro, supra note 4, at 638.
52. Pub. L. No. 91-517, 84 Stat. 1316 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1999))
[hereinafter The Developmental Disabilities Act].
53. See id,; see also Montanaro, supra note 4, at 638. The Developmental Disabilities Act
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In 1975, Congress passed the Education of the Handicapped Act, '
which was amended and renamed the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act in 1990."s This Act ensured children with disabilities
access to a free, appropriate, public education.56 Finally, in 1988
the Fair Housing Act 57 was enacted to prohibit discrimination
against persons with disabilities in housing.6 '
Unlike the ADA, which is a broad, antidiscrimination statute,
these early federal laws focused primarily on rehabilitating persons
with disabilities in order to facilitate re-entry into the workforce.6 '
It was not until 1973 that Congress passed a broad,
antidiscriminatory statute protecting persons with disabilities. The
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,60 still effective today, prohibits
discrimination against persons with disabilities by any program or
facility that receives federal funds."' The Rehabilitation Act also
extends to federal contractors and to those employed by federal
government agencies.62 Section 794 of the Rehabilitation Act
provides that "no otherwise qualified individual with a disability...
shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance. 3 Protection is thus limited and does not
extend to programs, services, or facilities in the private sector.6 4
Further, none of these pre-ADA laws expressly attempt to define
persons with disabilities as a quasi-suspect or suspect class for
was first passed in 1963 as a part of the Mental Health Retardation Facilities and
Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act, which strove to deinstitutionalize and
provide care to persons with mental disabilities through the creation of community mental
health centers. See Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (1963) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also FernandoJ. Gutierrez, Who Is Watching Big Brother When Big
Brother Is Watching Mental Health Professionals: A Call for the Evaluation of Mental Health
Advocacy Programs, 20 L. & PSYCHOL REV. 57, 59 (1996).
54. Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
20 U.S.C.).
55. See Montanaro, supra note 4, at 638.
56. See id.
57. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619
(1999)).
58. See id.; see also Montanaro, supra note 4, at 638.
59. See Montanaro, supra note 4, at 637-38.
60. Pub. L. No. 93-112,87 Stat. 355(1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791,793,
794 (1994 & Supp. 1998)).
61. See Montanaro, supra note 4, at 639.
62. See id.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
64. See id.; see also Montanaro, supra note 4, at 639 (describing the limited scope of the
Rehabilitation Act). But see Air Carrier Access Act of 1986,49 U.S.C. § 41705 (1994) (barring
discrimination by private air carriers based on disability).
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equal protection purposes. As a result, the judiciary bears the
responsibility of interpreting laws based on disability in the context
of the Equal Protection Clause.
C. Pre-ADA Case Law Interpreting Disability-Based Legislation
on Equal Protection Grounds
Three cases from the 1970s and 1980s illustrate the unsettled,6 5
yet evolving, nature of equal protection jurisprudence in the context
of disability.6 In the 1975 case Fialkowski v. Shapp,67 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
considered the plight of two mentally retarded boys who claimed
the state violated their equal protection rights by failing to provide
appropriate education."s The plaintiffs argued that retarded
children constitute a suspect class, and strict scrutiny equal
protection analysis thus should apply. 9
In its consideration of this issue, the court distinguished this
case from San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,0
in which the Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamen-
tal right.7' The court relied, however, on the criteria for determin-
ing a suspect class set forth in Rodriguez, including a "history of
purposeful unequal treatment," and the relegation to political
powerlessness.72 Further, the court discussed a North Dakota
Supreme Court case that found "handicapped" individuals consti-
tuted a suspect class using the Rodriguez factors. 3 While quoting
the North Dakota Supreme Court, the Fialkowski court stated:
"M[We are confident that the same [United States Supreme]
Court would have held that G.H.'s [the party in the North
Dakota case] terrible handicaps were just the sort of'imutable
characteristics determined solely by the accident of birth' to
which the Inherently suspect' classification would be applied,
and that depriving her of a meaningful educational opportunity
65. See Montanaro, supra note 4, at 644 (citingjudicial discretion and multiple standards
of review as the culprits).
66. Discussion is limited to three cases to provide an overview of the pre-ADA state of the
law of disability, not an exhaustive review of the case law from this era.
67. 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
68. See id. at 957.
69. See id. at 958.
70. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
71. See Fialkowski, 405 F. Supp. at 957 (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1).
72. Id. at 958-59 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1).
73. See id. at 959 (citing Interest of G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974)).
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would be just the sort of denial of equal protection which has
been held unconstitutional in cases involving discrimination
based on race and illegitimacy."
"° Although the present posture of this case does not require.
us to resolve this issue, we will say that depriving retarded
children of all educational benefits would appear to warrant
greater judicial scrutiny than that applied in Rodriguez.74
The court's reference to both illegitimacy, a quasi-suspect class,
and race, a suspect class, reflects its indecision about whether
persons with disabilities should be considered a quasi-suspect class
or a suspect class.
Notwithstanding this statement, the court concluded that "there
may be no rational basis" for providing education to most children
while denying mentally retarded children appropriate education.75
Nonetheless, the Fialkowski court apparently considered persons
with disabilities a class deserving of some level of heightened
scrutiny, while at the same time recognizing that heightened or
strict scrutiny may not be necessary to prevail on an equal protec-
tion claim.7" Though decided before Cleburne, this case is one of the
few instances in which the rational basis test resulted in the
invalidation of a statute."
Four years after the Fialkowski decision, in 1979, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois decided
the issue of which level of equal protection review to accord to
persons with mental illnesses in Sterling v. Harris.7' The plaintiffs
in Sterling were a group of aged, blind, and/or disabled persons.
They challenged, under the Equal Protection Clause, certain
sections of a federal law that prohibited them from receiving
benefits under the federally funded Supplemental Security Income
Program (SSI). 79 After discussingthe three levels of equal protec-
tion review, the court decided that persons with mental illness
constitute a quasi-suspect class.' ° The court noted that "[n]o
Supreme Court or court of appeals case characterizing mental
74. IL. at 959 (quoting G.H., 218 N.W.2d at 447).
76. Id.
76. But see Montanaro, supra note 4, at 644 (asserting that courts often apply heighten
scrutiny 'masquerading as the rational basis standard*).
77. See also Montanaro, supra note 4, at 643-44 & n.149 (citing O'Brien v. Skinner, 414
U.S. 524 (1974), and United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), as two
other instances).
78. 478 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
79. See i& at 1048 (noting that the plaintiffs were challenging 42 U.S.C. § 1382(eX1XA)-
(B)).
80. See id. at 1053.
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illness for purposes of equal protection analysis ha[d] been called to
[its] attention,"81 and in the absence thereof, the court applied the
Supreme Court's factors for determining quasi-suspect classification
to persons with mental illness.8 2 In holding that persons with
mental illnesses constitute a quasi-suspect class, the court stated,
"it appears that mental health classifications possess the significant
indicia of the suspect classifications recognized in other cases."8
In its summary of pre-1979 lower court decisions considering
this same question, the Sterling court noted that two district courts
had refused to classify persons with disabilities as quasi-suspect or
suspect," whereas two district courts had classified persons with
disabilities as a quasi-suspect class.8 5
Finally, in the 1983 case of J.W. v. City of Tacoma," the Ninth
Circuit considered the issue of whether the denial of a zoning
permit that would have allowed formerly institutionalized mental
patients to reside in group homes in a residential district violated
the Equal Protection Clause. 7 The court further considered the
appropriate level of equal protection scrutiny to accord such a
classification.
81. Id. at 1051.
82. The court noted that these factors include immutability, the level of the relationship
between the classification and the "ability to perform or contribute to society," the fact that
the group is a "politically impotent, insular minority" and that the group has a "history of
purposeful unequal treatment." Id at 1052 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973), San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), and Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)).
83. Id.
84. See id. The court cited New York State Association for Retarded Children v.
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), which held that the mentally retarded did not
constitute a suspect class, based on the reasoning that the plaintiffs, residents of an
institution for the mentally retarded, did not prove discrimination based on suspect criteria.
Further, in Rockefeller, the court considered only the issue of classification under the
traditional two-tier test and did not consider that disability may fall into a middle-tier test
which later became more clearly recognized. The Sterling court also cited Doe v. Colautti,
464 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1978), which held that legislation limiting benefits for psychiatric
care was not subject to strict scrutiny. The Doe court did note that intermediate, or
heightened, scrutiny may have been appropriate, but concluded that the legislation would
have survived such intermediate scrutiny.
85. See Sterling, 478 F. Supp. at 1052. The court cited Frederick v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp.
832 (E.D. Pa. 1976), which held that learning disabled children constituted a minority class
that compelled the use of the "middle test" of equal protection analysis based on the
children's political powerlessness and minority status, and Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp.
946 (E.D. Pa. 1975), which held that the mentally retarded were entitled to "greater judicial
scrutiny,* which the Sterling court interpreted as heightened scrutiny, based on political
powerlessness and purposeful unequal treatment.
86. 720 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1983).
87. See id. at 1127-28.
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The court stated that the "ordinance may well result from
'archaic and stereotypic notions' and must therefore receive special
judicial attention." The court explained, however, that the class
of former mental patients did not constitute a "full-fledged suspect
class for purposes of constitutional analysis" 9 as factual circum-
stances may exist in which classifications based on mental illness
would represent "special problems best addressed by special
legislative measures.' ° The court held that "the discrimination
against former mental patients embodied in the Tacoma zoning
ordinance is valid if rational, but that it is rational only if it
furthers some substantial goal of the municipality."91 Although the
court described its level of review as "rational," its requirement that
the ordinance further a "substantial" state or municipal interest
indicates that heightened scrutiny was applied.
Equal protection jurisprudence addressing disability was thus
inconsistent and unsettled into the early 1980s.92 Courts around
the country held that persons with disabilities fell within all of the
equal protection tiers.93 This judicial confusion and lack of
consistency disappeared, however, when the Supreme Court
addressed the equal protection issue in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center."
D. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
In 1985, the Supreme Court seemingly resolved the issue of
what level of scrutiny should be applied to legislation involving
persons with disabilities. Cleburne involved the City of Cleburne's
denial of a special use permit to the operator of a group home for
mentally retarded adults.95 The City based its denial on a zoning
ordinance that required permits for such homes."
In holding that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection
Clause, the Fifth Circuit concluded that persons with mental
retardation constitute a quasi-suspect class.97 The Fifth Circuit
applied the heightened scrutiny test to the ordinance and decided
88. Id. at 1129 (citation omitted).
89. 1d. at 1129-30.
90. Id. at 1130.
91. Id. (relying on Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982)).
92. See Montanaro, supra note 4, at 622.
93. See id. at 643-44.
94. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).




that it did not substantially further a legitimate government
interest.9" This opinion overturned the District Court, which had
upheld the ordinance on the grounds that it did not violate any
fundamental right, nor did it involve a quasi-suspect or suspect
classification."
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's
invalidation of the ordinance, it did so on different grounds. The
Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's quasi-suspect classification of
persons with disabilities and held instead that persons with
disabilities constitute a non-suspect class, thereby necessitating
application of the rational basis level of equal protection review.100
The Cleburne Court provided four reasons for its holding that
persons with disabilities constitute a non-suspect class deserving
only rational basis review. First, the Court stated that persons
with mental retardation'0 1 are undeniably different as they have a
"reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world."0 2
As a result, the Court noted that persons with mental retardation
are "thus different, immutably so, in relevant respects, and the
States' interest in dealing with and providing for them is plainly a
legitimate one."0" Thus, the Court decided that heightened
scrutiny would frustrate legislative attempts to craft appropriate,
nondiscriminatory laws addressing disability by frequently
invalidating such laws.'" Utilizing an institutional competence
98. See id.
99. See id. at 437-38.
100. See id. at 435.
101. I use the words "mentally retarded" and "persons with disabilities" interchangeably
in my discussion of Cleburne because, although the Court addressed the issue of mental
retardation in this case, its holding has been interpreted to deem all persons with disabilities
as non-suspect for equal protection purposes. I do not necessarily agree with the conflation
of mental retardation specifically and disability generally, although most post-Cleburne
decisions reach this conclusion. I disagree with the conclusion because the Court supposedly
strives to reach its decisions, especially those of constitutional import, on the narrowest
grounds possible. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. United States,
527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999) ("It is, however, an established part of our constitutional
jurisprudence that we do not ordinarily reach out to make novel or unnecessarily broad
pronouncements on constitutional issues when a case can be fully resolved on a narrower
ground."). One of the methods of reaching the narrowest possible decisions is to confine a
holding to its facts. In Cleburne, the individuals involved were mentally retarded, a sub-
population of the diverse community of persons with disabilities. I find it surprising that
more courts did not distinguish Cleburne on this basis and characterize persons with other
types of disabilities as a quasi-suspect or suspect class. In fact, if Cleburne can be read as
narrowly as I have proposed, the Court could declare persons with disabilities a quasi-
suspect class without disturbing Cleburne. See infra Part V.B.
102. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 443 ("[IH]eightened judicial scrutiny inevitably involves substantive
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argument, the Court denied quasi-suspect classification to persons
with disabilities.' 5
A second reason the Court offered for using rational basis
review was the presence of state and national laws addressing
disability which attempted to right historical wrongs against the
mentally retarded. ' The Court stated that "lawmakers have been
addressing their [persons with mental retardation] difficulties in a
manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a
corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary. 10 7
The Court pointed to these laws as examples of desirable outcomes
of legislative involvement with issues of disability, stating that such
laws are "not only legitimate but also desirable.""'8 The Court also
stressed the importance of legislative flexibility in crafting, such
laws.1 9 While treating the Cleburne ordinance as an anomaly in
disability law, the Court distinguished it from the "big picture" of
disability law and invalidated it on the rational basis level.
The third reason offered by the Court to deny heightened
scrutiny to persons with disabilities was that the presence of many
laws protecting persons with disabilities disabused any notion that
this group was politically powerless. " The fourth and final reason
proffered by the Court was that vast diversity within the commu-
nity of persons with disabilities would make quasi-suspect classifi-
cation of this group unwieldy, unmanageable, and impractical.1
The Court opined:
[Ilt would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a
variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabili-
ties setting them off from others, who cannot themselves
mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim
some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at
large.1
12
judgments about legislative decisions, and we doubt that the predicate for such judicial
oversight is present where the classification deals with mental retardation.").
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. Id. (citing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Developmental Disabilities Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act, and the Education of the Handicapped Act as examples).
108. Id. at 444.
109. See id.




This reasoning also can be labeled the "slippery slope" argument."'3
The Court asserted all of these reasons while recognizing that
discrimination against persons with disabilities continues. The
Court therefore concluded:
Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the govern-
ment may legitimately take into account in a wide range. of.
decisions, and because both State and Federal Governments
have recently committed themselves to assisting the retarded,,
we will not presume that any given legislative action, even one
that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in consider-
ations that the Constitution will not tolerate.
1 14
The Court then considered the four government interests
offered by the City and rejected all of them under the rational basis
test, invalidating the ordinance as applied in this case." '
The Cleburne dissent, however, sharply disagreed with the
majority's opinion. In the dissent, written by Justice Marshall and
joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, Marshall criticized the
majority's reasoning as inconsistent with prior rational basis equal
protection cases."' The dissent accused the majority of applying
heightened scrutiny under the guise of rational basis.1 7 Justice
Marshall called for what legal scholars have labeled the "multi-
factor, sliding scale" model of equal protection review."' According
to Justice Marshall, "the level of scrutiny employed in an equal
protection case should vary with 'the constitutional and societal
importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification
is drawn.'"11 Similarly, Justice Stevens's concurrence stated his
belief that equal protection cases should be based on a test more
fluid than the traditional, rigid three-tiered model.1"0 Justice
Stevens wrote, "[olur cases reflect a continuum of judgmental
responses to differing classifications. . . . I have never been
persuaded that these so-called 'standards' adequately explain the
113. The "slippery slope" has been described as "[tihe tendency of a principle to expand
itself to the limit of its logic." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 733 n.23 (1997).
114. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
115. See id. at 447-50.
116. See id. at 455-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 456 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. See, e.g., Baroutian, supra note 16, at 1316-17 n.314 (citing Gerald Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1972)).
119. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
120. See id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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decisional process."12' According to Justice Marshall, heightened
scrutiny was the correct level of scrutiny to be applied to persons
with disabilities and the correct result would have been an invalida-
tion of the ordinance on its face, in contrast to the majority's result
of an invalidation of the ordinance as applied."
The Cleburne decision engendered much discussion, debate,
and criticism. Many commentators and scholars considered-the
decision disingenuous, because it seemed to apply heightened
scrutiny while claiming to apply rational basis. 123 Cleburne's legacy,
however, is that persons with disabilities are considered a non-
suspect class for equal protection purposes.
124
E. The ADA
When Congress passed the ADA in 1990, persons with disabili-
ties for the first time had legal recourse for a wide array of discrimi-
nation, against both public and private actors. The law quickly
became known as the "Emancipation Proclamation" for persons
with disabilities.12 The ADA consists of five titles and reaches all
areas of life.
Title I prohibits discrimination in employment. 26 Title I
mandates that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
121. Id. It was Justice Stevens's adherence to a more fluid notion of equal protection
scrutiny that allowed him to join in the majority's holding. Stevens stated:
In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic questions. What
class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a "tradition of
disfavor" by our laws? What is the public purpose that is being served by the
law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the
disparate treatment? In most cases, the answer to these questions will tell us
whether the statute has a 'rational basis."
Id. at 463 (citations omitted). Thus, Stevens concluded: "I cannot believe that a rational
member of this disadvantaged class could ever approve of the discriminatory application of
the city's ordinance in this case. Accordingly, I join the opinion of the Court." Id. at 455.
122. See id. at 474-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123. See Baroutjian, supra note 16, at 1311-12 (citing Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational
Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779,794 (1987), and
Sande Buhai Pond, NoDogsAllowed" Hawaii's Quarantine Law Violates the Rights of People
with Disabilities, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 145, 191-92 (1995)).
124. See Montanaro, supra note 4, at 644.
125. See id. at 622 (citing Glen Elasser, Senate Ok's Rights Bill for Disabled, Cm. TRIB.,
Sept. 9, 1989, at 1, and Tom Harkin, Our Newest CivilRights Law, 26 TRIAL 56 (Dec. 1990)).
126. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1999).
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job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment""'27 and applies to employers of fifteen or more employees.12
Title II prohibits discrimination against persons with disabili-
tiesin public services.2 9 Title II states that "no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity."3 0 This title thus prohibits
discrimination by state or local governments against persons with
disabilities.
Title III prohibits discrimination against persons with disabili-
ties in public accommodations. 131 Public accommodations include
services and facilities operated by private, non-government entities.
Hotels, restaurants, movie theaters, banks, museums, day care
centers, and golf courses are all examples of public accommoda-
tions." 2 Title III states, "[no individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases
(or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 133
Title IV prohibits discrimination against persons with disabili-
ties in telecommunications.13 Title IV states that the "[Equal
Employment Opportunity] Commission shall ensure that interstate
and intrastate telecommunications relay services are available, to
the extent possible and in the most efficient manner, to hearing-
impaired and speech-impaired individuals in the United States.""3
Finally, Title V contains miscellaneous provisions addressing
the scope of the ADA." Two particular provisions in Title V are
important to note in this Article. First, Title V provides that "[a]
State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment.., from
an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for
a violation of this chapter."' 37 As discussed below, this provision
becomes important in analyzing equal protection cases involving
persons with disabilities under the ADA.
127. Id. § 12112(a).
128. See id. § 12111(5)A).
129. See 42 U.S.C. §1 12131-12165 (1999).
130. Id § 12132.
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 12151-12189 (1999).
132. See id. § 12181(7)(A)-(C), (F), (H), (K), (L).
133. Id § 12182(a).
134. See 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1999).
135. Id. § 225(bX1).
136. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (1999).
137. Id. I 12202.
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Second, Title V states that homosexuality and bisexuality are
"not impairments and as such are not disabilities" under the
ADA.' Further, this section of Title V states "the term 'disability'
shall not include: transvestism, transsexualism [and] gender
identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other
sexual behavior disorders."' 9 As discussed below, these provisions
are important in an analysis of the disparate federal treatment of
persons with disabilities and lesbians and gay men.
F. Post-ADA Case Law: Equal Protection Revisited
. Many persons with disabilities have brought suits under the
ADA since its passage. These cases often involve relatively
straightforward legal challenges under only the ADA and no other
statutory or constitutional claims. Each case requires a fact-
intensive inquiry; the court must determine whether the plaintiff
meets the ADA definition of a person with a disability, must
determine which title of the ADA is implicated, must consider any
defenses available to the defendant, and must reach a decision
under the statute."4 Although the process is not merely a simple,
mechanical application of the statute, ADA cases involving no more
than the ADA statute itself are relatively more straightforward
than cases involving equal protection claims alone, or equal
protection claims in addition to other statutory claims such as the
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.1'
In these more complicated cases, disabled plaintiffs often have
attempted to use the ADA, particularly the congressional findings
included in Title I, to claim that persons with disabilities are now
entitled to heightened scrutiny in equal protection cases." 2 No
discussion of this issue would be complete without mention of the
recent Supreme Court decision in City of Boerne v. Flores."3 Boerne
involved neither disability nor sexual orientation, but it did address
the issue of whether Congress can legislate substantive rights
resulting from the Fourteenth Amendment. The issue in Boerne
138. Id. § 12211(a).
139. Id. § 12211(bXl).
140. See, e.g., Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., 923 F. Supp. 720, 734-38 (D.
Md. 1996).
141. See, e.g., Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1116-31
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998).
142. See, e.g., id. at 1132 (noting that language employedin the congressional findings was
intended to force courts to subject litigation or behavior respecting disabled persons to a
strict scrutiny review).
143. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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was the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) of 1993, a federal law requiring courts to use the compelling
interest test in cases involving laws, even neutral laws, that burden
the exercise of religion. "
The Boerne Court held the RFRA to be an unconstitutional
exercise of Congress's powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 5 The Court held that Congress may not legislate
substantive Fourteenth Amendment rights; in fact, Congress may
not expand the substantive rights ensured under the Fourteenth
Amendment more broadly than those already set forth by the
Supreme Court.146
The Boerne Court also articulated a complex test for determin-
ing when Congress has exceeded its Section 5 powers. The test,
known as the "congruence and proportionality" test,'4 7 requires a
"congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented
or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a
connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and
effect."' The future impact of Boerne, especially on the ADA, is
uncertain.149 Courts considering equal protection claims under the
ADA now do so through the lens of Boerne.
Another issue plagues ADA cases. Courts are split on whether
the ADA overrules Cleburne's holding that persons with disabilities
are a non-suspect class. A small minority of courts have held that
the ADA, with its use of the language "discrete and insular minor-
ity," overruled Cleburne and created a suspect classification for
144. See id. at 512. The Court noted that Congress enacted the EFRA in response to a
prior Supreme Court decision with the express goal of increasing the level of equal protection
scrutiny in this way. See id.
145. See id. at 513-25. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power
to enforce the amendment's guarantees: "Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5.
146. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
147. See id. at 508.
148. Id.
149. A complete consideration of Boerne and its impact on the constitutionality ofthe ADA
is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, I will discuss Boerne as one factor, albeit an
important one, to consider in the future of equal protection claims for both persons with
disabilities and lesbians and gay men. See infra Part V. For a more detailed discussion of
Boerne and its implications for the ADA, see generally Ronald D. Rotunda, The Americans
with Disabilities Act, Bar Examinations, and the Constitution: A Balancing Act, B.
EXAMINER, Aug. 1997, at 6; Nonsuspect Classes, supra note 11; Ronald D. Rotunda, The
Powers of Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After City of Boerne v.
Flores, 32 IND. L. REV. 163 (1998) [hereinafter Rotunda, The Powers of Congress); Welter,
supra note 11.
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persons with disabilities. 50 In Martin v. Voinovich,'5" the plaintiffs,
a group of persons with mental retardation or developmental
disabilities, claimed violations of several federal laws, including the
ADA, as well as violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The
plaintiffs based their claims on the State of Ohio's denial of
community housing.
15 2
The District Court relied on Congress's findings contained in
Title I of the ADA to hold that heightened scrutiny was required in
this case. The court stated that "classifications for purposes of
providing community residential services through existing state
programs . . . are subject at least to intermediate heightened
scrutiny based on Congress' findings in [section] 12101 [of the
ADA].L"53 Martin, however, was decided before Boerne and,
therefore, may not be decided the same way today.
Most other courts, in contrast, have held that the ADA did not
alter the level of equal protection scrutiny accorded to persons with
disabilities. In Brown v. North Carolina Division of Motor
Vehicles,15' a class of persons with disabilities challenged the fee
levied against them for the issuance of parking placards that
enabled them to park in handicapped parking spaces.'55 The
plaintiffs challenged the fee under the ADA, specifically under a
regulation promulgated under the ADA that prohibits public
entities from charging a fee to recoup the cost of programs ensuring
accessibility for persons with disabilities.'"
Although the plaintiff did not assert an equal protection
violation, the court considered the issue of Congress's power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically under the
Equal Protection Clause. The Brown court held that the regulation
at issue was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Section 5
power. 157 The court stated:
A congressional attempt to redefine the holding of Cleburne
abounds. For example, in Cleburne, the Supreme Court
declared that the mentally disabled were a "large and diversi-
fied group" and "doubt[ed] that the predicate for [heightened
150. See, e.g., Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 293-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); People v.
Green, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 133 (N.Y. County Ct. 1990).
151. 840 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
152. See id. at 1180-81.
153. Id. at 1209.
154. 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
155. See id. at 701.
156. See id, (noting that the regulation being challenged was 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f)).
157. See id. at 706.
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scrutiny] is present." The ADA, by contrast, specifically takes
issue with the Court's definitional choice and declares that
"individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minor-
ity." This declaration evinces an intent not to remedy violations
of the standard of Cleburne, but rather to effect a "substantive
alteration of its holding." In striking state legislation that is
clearly rationally grounded, Congress sought to do what
Cleburne said it may not do-establish a new suspect or quasi-
suspect protection classification."5
Another case that exemplifies the majority view is Bartlett v.
New York State Board of Law Examiners.19 In Bartlett, a bar
examination applicant brought suit claiming, among other things,
violation of the ADA and the Equal Protection Clause.'" The
plaintiff claimed that the Board of Law Examiners failed to provide
reasonable accommodations during the bar examination.'6 1 The
court noted that many courts were uncertain about whether
Congress could legislate, through the ADA, a level of scrutiny
higher than that deemed proper by the Supreme Court. The
Bartlett court then relied on Boerne in stating:
The Supreme Court's recent invalidation of RFRA in City of
Boerne v. P.F. Flores suggests an answer to the question
whether Congress has the authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to declare what level of scrutiny should be em-
ployed in equal protection cases. Although Boerne involved
religious liberty and the Due Process, not the Equal Protection,
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court's
holding that Congress does not have the power to declare
substantive protections, but only has the power to enforce them,
is easily applicable to the instant question, particularly given
Congress' § 5 power is the same under both clauses. 2
After declaring that the ADA thus did not alter the level of
scrutiny applicable to persons with disabilities, the court applied
the rational basis test as mandated by Cleburne. " Recognizing the
unsettled state of equal protection law since the enactment of the
ADA, the court concluded:
158. Id. at 708.
159. 970 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 156
F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998).
160. See id. at 1098.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 1134.
163. See id. at 1135.
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Boerne tells us that Congress may not, under the ADA, directly.
alter the level of scrutiny afforded the disabled under the Equal;
Protection Clause. What remains to be seen, however, is what
will be done with Congress' fact-driven suggestion in the ADA
that courts themselves change the level of scrutiny afforded
,handicapped persons. For these reasons to be discussed, in thelend, the question must be left for the Supreme Court to
decide.164
As a result of these varying views of the Boerne case, the future
of equal protection claims in the context of the ADA is uncertain,
and the ultimate resolution of the issue can come only from the
Supreme Court.
IV. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW:
HISTORY AND CURRENT TRENDS
A Discrimination and Oppression of Lesbians and Gay Men
Like the position and plight of persons with disabilities, the
place and stature of lesbians and gay men in American society has
risen to the forefront of the legal and cultural discourse over the
past several decades.'" There is little disagreement that lesbians
and gay men, like persons with disabilities, have been vilified,
hated, and discriminated against throughout American history."' 6
This discrimination has pervaded all aspects of the lives of lesbians
and gay men, including employment, family life, involvement in
political organizations, and at times has caused them to fear for
their physical safety." 7 More importantly, this discrimination
emanates from both institutions and individuals. 6 8
A recent case from Ohio articulated well the discrimination
faced by lesbians and gay men. Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati'6 9 (Equality Foundation I) involved
164. Id.
165. See generally Tressa M. Bruce, Neither Liberty Nor Justice: Anti-Gay Initiatives,
Political Participation, and the Rule of Law, 5 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POLY 431 (1996) (noting
the rise of the lesbian and gay rights movement from the 1960s into the 1990s and the
resultant struggle for legal and social protections for this class of Americans).
166. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp.
417, 426 (S.D. Ohio 1994). See generally Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in
the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283 (1993).
167. See generally Schacter, supra note 166.
168. See Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 426.
169. 860 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
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a challenge to a municipal ordinance enacted through a ballot
initiative. 170 The ordinance, known as Issue 3, prohibited any entity
of the municipality from enacting, adopting, enforcing, or adminis-
tering any "ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which provides that
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or
relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person
with the basis to have a claim of minority or protected status.1
Issue 3 also had the effect of deeming null and void a preexisting
city ordinance known as the Human Rights Ordinance which
prohibited private actors from discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation in housing, employment, or public accommodation. 172
The plaintiffs, a class of lesbians and gay men, challenged Issue 3
on several grounds, including equal protection grounds. 73
In finding that lesbians and gay men constitute a quasi-suspect
class,17 4 the District Court made extensive findings of fact. The
court found that discrimination against lesbians and gay men has
caused, and continues to cause, "profound negative psychological"
harm to homosexuals.175 The Equality Foundation I court described
the testimony of George Chauncey, one of the plaintiffs' witnesses:
He described the pervasiveness of the discrimination, both
public and private, and how this anti-gay bias was perpetuated
throughout all levels of society and government, from state and
local law enforcement activities to a former presidential
directive against homosexuals from government employment
and private employment by government contractors. He also
described how local laws were employed to crush early gay
political organizations, and how public antipathy and stereotyp-
ing was prevalent. He also described the prevalence of anti-gay
violence. 176
170. See id. at 421.
171. Id. at 422 (citing Issue 3 ordinance).
172. See i, at 422.
173. See id.
174. This holding was subsequently overruled by the Sixth Circuit, which ruled that
lesbians and gay men do not constitute a quasi-suspect or suspect class for equal protection
purposes. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261
(6th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, only to vacate and remand to the
Sixth Circuit for reconsideration in light of the then-recent Supreme Court decision in Romer
v. Evans. On remand, the Sixth Circuit again held that lesbians and gay men are a non-
suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati,
Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
175. Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 424-26.
176. Id. at 425; see also WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXuAL
ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 336-60 (2d ed. 1997); Note, An Argument for the Application of
Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL.
L. REv. 797 (1984) [hereinafter Heightened Scrutiny].
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Further, the words of Justice Marshall's dissent in Cleburne7
regarding persons with mental retardation applies equally well to
the current status of lesbians and gay men:
For the retarded, just as for Negroes and women, much has.
changed in recent years, but much remains the same; out-dated
statutes on the books, and irrational fears or ignorance,
traceable to the prolonged social and cultural isolation of the
retarded, continue to stymie recognition of the dignity and
individuality of retarded people. Heightened judicial scrutiny
of action appearing to impose unnecessary barriers to the
'retarded is required in light of increasing recognition that such
barriers are inconsistent with evolving principles of equality
embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 8
If one -substitutes the words "lesbian" or "gay man" for the word
"retarded" in Justice Marshall's statement, one would have an
accurate depiction of the state of the law and the social climate for
lesbians and gay men today. Lesbians and gay men, like persons
with disabilities, have seen much change in the recent past,
specifically in the legal realm, where they have won the right to
adopt children, 79 to be protected from discrimination in employ-
ment, housing, and public accommodation," 0 to serve in the
military,1 8 ' and to obtain "domestic partner" benefits.8 2 However,
like persons with disabilities in Cleburne, "much remains the same"
for lesbians and gay men. Violence motivated by hatred for
177. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
178. Id. at 467 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. See, e.g., In Re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (N.Y. Surrogate's Ct. 1992)
(holding that the lesbian life partner could legally adopt her partner's child without severing
the biological mother's parental rights); see also RUBENSTEIN, supra note 176, at 846-74
(discussing adoption by lesbians, gay men, and bisexual parents and examining relevant case
law).
180. See generally RUBENSTEIN, supra note 176, at 416-31 (discussing the experiences of
lesbians and gay men in the workplace).
181. See, e.g., Watkin v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, amended, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th
Cir. 1988).
182. See, e.g., Gay Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y., 585 N.Y.S.2d
1016 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (affirming lower court's dezial of summary judgment to
defendant, City of New York, which had denied health insurance coverage to partners of
lesbian and gay teachers). The case later settled, with the City agreeing to provide full
benefits to the partners of lesbian and gay teachers. See Mireya Navarro, New Choices in
Care: New York Extends Health Benefits to Domestic Partners of City Employees, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 1993, at BI; see also RUBENSTEN, supra note 176, at 789 (noting a Washington, D.C.
ordinance that "requires private employers to provide certain benefits to lesbian/gay
couples").
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homosexuals is still commonplace.'" In many jurisdictions,
lesbians and gay men can be fired from their jobs or evicted from
their homes because of their sexual orientation.'" Some gay and
lesbian parents still lose custodial or visitation rights based on their
sexual orientation.8 5 Further, lesbians and gay men cannot marry
under the laws of any state, or under federal law.'" And, like
persons with disabilities, much of society's discrimination against
lesbians and gay men is rooted in "irrational fears or ignorance,
traceable to the prolonged social and cultural isolation" of homosex-
uals.187
Finally, the same year that the Supreme Court decided
Cleburne, it denied certiorari to Rowland v. Mad River Local School
District.1 In his dissent of the Court's denial of certiorari, Justice
Brennan stated lesbians and gay men "constitute a significant and
insular minority of this country's population. . . . Moreover,
homosexuals have historically been the object of pernicious and
sustained hostility, and it is fair to say that discrimination against
homosexuals is 'likely ... to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather
than . . . rationality.'"' 89 Although a dissent from a denial of
certiorari has no precedential value, and is in fact a rare occur-
rence, the language of this particular dissent is noteworthy in that
it provides an unusual glimpse into the thinking of at least two
members of the Court (Justice Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's
dissent) on the issues raised concerning homosexuality and the
Constitution.
The trend in the law with regard to sexual orientation has
differed from the trend in disability law. Like the Cleburne case for
persons with disabilities, the 1986 Supreme Court decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick'9 created a benchmark for equal protection
jurisprudence for lesbians and gay men. Although Bowers stated
183. See Margaret Carlson, Laws of Last Resort, TIME, Oct. 26, 1998, at 40,40 (discussing
hate crimes against lesbians and gay men); Steve Lopez, To Be Young and Gay in Wyoming,
TIME, Oct. 26,1998, at 38,38-40 (describing the brutal murder of a young, gay man, Matthew
Shepard, in Wyoming, and citing a TIMEICNN poll showing that 68% of those polled believe
an attack on a gay person could occur in their own community).
184. See Schacter, supra note 166, at 298.
185. See id.
186. See John Cloud, For Better of Worse: In Hawaii, A Showdown over Marriage Tests the
Limits of Gay Activism, TIME, Oct. 26, 1998, at 43.
187. See Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 437 ("We conclude that it is a matter of fact
beyond dispute that gays, lesbians and bisexuals have suffered a history of discrimination.
based on inaccurate, stereotyped notions of their sexual orientation.").
188. 470 U.S. 1009, 1009 (1985).
189. Id. at 1014 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
190. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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that homosexuality does not constitute a quasi-suspect or suspect
class for due process purposes, it is still relied on by many courts
today to deny heightened scrutiny in equal protection cases. -
B. Pre-Bowers Federal Laws and Policies Based on Sexual
Orientation
Although gay men and lesbians have been subject to overt
public discrimination since the 1940s, "[flor the pre-World War II
generations, however, there is little... evidence of discrimination.
Homosexuality was a far less visible phenomenon .... The laws and
public policies of a later time had not yet taken shape.""" In the
1950s, gay groups began to organize around the country, mostly in
urban areas. As lesbians and gay men became increasingly visible,
the federal government began promulgating discriminatory policies
toward this group.
In the 1960s, the United States Civil Service Commission
promulgated a policy, which was published in a Federal Personnel
Manual Supplement and stated: "Homosexuality and Sexual
Perversion-Persons about whom there is evidence that they have
engaged in or solicited others to engage in homosexual or sexually
perverted acts with them, without evidence of rehabilitation, are
not suitable for Federal Employment."9 After this policy was
challenged in Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, the
Civil Service modified its regulation and personnel manual.9 The
new policy, announced in 1973, stated:
Accordingly, you may not find a person unsuitable for Federal
employment merely because that person is a homosexual or has
engaged in homosexual acts, nor may such exclusion be based
on such a conclusion that a homosexual person might bring the
public service into public contempt. You are, however, permit-
ted to dismiss a person or find him or her unsuitable for Federal
employment where the evidence establishes that such person's
homosexual conduct affects job fitness--excluding from such
consideration, however, unsubstantiated conclusions concerning
possible embarrassment to the Federal service."
191. John D'Emilio, Makingand UnmakingMinorities: The Tensions Between Gay History
and Politics, in RUBENSTIN, supra note 176, at 681, 681.
192. Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 264 (9th Cir. 1976).
193. See id. at 255.
194. Id. at 254.
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Finally, in 1975, regulations addressing"Suitability Disqualifi-
cation" were modified to read, in part, "[clourt decisions require
that persons not be disqualified from Federal employment solely on
the basis of homosexual conduct.... [A] person may be dismissed
or found unsuitable for Federal employment where the evidence
establishes that such person's sexual conduct affects job fitness."'95
Military service also has been closed to lesbians and gay men
for quite some time. The military has had a ban on lesbians and
gay men serving in the armed forces since World War I.' 1n 1981,
the Department of Defense promulgated regulations defining
homosexuality and stating that homosexuality was incompatible
withmilitary service. 97 In 1994, the policy was amended into what
has become known as the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue" rule.
This new rule purports to modify the previous policy by expelling
only those members of the armed services who state that they are
homosexual, or who engage in homosexual behavior, or who attempt
to marry someone of the same gender.19
Some significant strides have been made. Since 1992, several
federal agencies have adopted nondiscrimination policies that
include sexual orientation. These agencies include the Depart-
ments of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Energy, Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, Health and Human Services, Housing and
Urban Development, Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation,
Treasury, and the White House.'"
These pre-Bowers policies are noteworthy in their scope. They
were not federal laws, but were instead policies. They did not apply
to private actors or even to federal actors outside of employment
within the federal government. In these ways, they were markedly
different than the pre-Cleburne laws for persons with disabilities.
C. Bowers v. Hardwick 2 1
In Bowers, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a
Georgia statute outlawing sodomy.20' A gay man named Michael
Hardwick, arrested for violating the statute, subsequently chal-
195. Id. at 255.
196. See RAND CORPORATION REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. MILTARY
PoLICY ON HOMOSEXUALITY AND SODOMY-1916-1993, in RUBENSTEIN, supra note 176, at
585, 585.
197. See id. at 590.
198. See 10 U.S.C-.A § 654 (1995), in RUBENSTEIN, supra note 176, at 592-95.
199. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 176, at 523-24.
200. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
201. See id. at 187.
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lenged the law based on Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
grounds.0 2 The Supreme Court held that there is no substantive
due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to engage in
private, consensual homosexual sodomy, even in the privacy of one's
home.2 °3
The Court rejected Hardwick's claim that there is a fundamen-
tal right to engage in private, consensual homosexual sodomyand
that laws implicating this right are subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny.20 ' The Court also rejected Hardwick's alternative claim
that the sodomy statute failed even rational basis review, because
the law, according to Hardwick, was based only on "the presumed
belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable."20 5 The Court responded:
"The law is... constantly based on notions of morality."2 The
Court explained, as a basis for its decision, that "[piroscriptions
against [homosexual] conduct have ancient roots. Sodomy was a
criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of
the original 13 States .... In fact, until 1961, all 50 States
outlawed sodomy."0
Equal protection cases based on sexual orientation that
followed Bowers relied on Bowers as holding that lesbians and gay
men are a non-suspect class. Bowers, however, dealt only with
sexual privacy in the context of a constitutional due process claim
at a time in our cultural and legal history when the nature of sexual
orientation as a factor in our society was still emerging and was
largely misunderstood.0 8 Today, sexual orientation is seen more
and more as an integral and core component of democratic process
and participation, against a backdrop of deeply rooted, societal
discrimination. 29 Further, contrary to the case law asserting that
Bowers rejected the claim that lesbians and gay men are a suspect
or quasi-suspect class, that case instead merely held that there is
no fundamental, due process right for homosexuals to engage in
private, consensual sodomy. Bowers did not address the issue of
whether homosexuals constitute a suspect class for the purpose of
202. See id. at 194-96.
203. See id. at 191-93.
204. See id. at 192.
205. Id. at 196.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 192-93.
208. See generally Bruce, supra note 165.
209. See generally John Leland, Shades of Gay, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 2000, at 46
(commenting on the unprecedented profile of lesbians and gay men in politics, the force of
lesbians and gay men at the polls, and shifting attitudes toward homosexuality).
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equal protection analysis and did not need to do so to uphold the
Georgia sodomy law at issue in that case. Instead, it was the
Court's hesitance to create or extend a fundamental right that
seemed to inform its decision to decline to apply heightened
scrutiny in a due process inquiry. This doctrinal challenge faced by
the Bower's Court has been described in Watkins v. United States
Army.210 The Watkins court stated:
While it is not our role to question Hardwick's concerns about
the substantive due process and specifically the right to privacy,
these concerns have little relevance to equal protection doctrine.
... This principle of equal treatment, when imposed against
majoritarian rule, arises from the Constitution itself, not from
judicial fiat.... [Tihe practical difficulties of defining the
requirements imposed by equal protection, while not insignifi-
cant, do not involve the judiciary in the same degree of value-
based line-drawing that the Supreme Court in Hardwick found
so troublesome in defining the contours of substantive due
process. In short, the driving force behind Hardwick is the
Court's ongoing concern with the expansion of rights under
substantive due process . ... "
Thus, any inference that Bowers precluded a finding of suspect
classification for lesbians and gay men in an equal protection
context is inaccurate. This distinction, however, is one not em-
braced by a majority of courts considering equal protection claims
by lesbians and gay men.
D. Post-Bowers Cases: Equal Protection Revisited
Many lower courts have considered Bowers in deciding equal
protection claims based on sexual orientation. These cases held that
homosexuals do not constitute a quasi-suspect or suspect class and,
therefore, applied the rational basis test.212 Padula v. Webster s13
was one of the first cases decided after Bowers that relied on
Bowers to deny lesbians and gay men suspect classification in the
210. 837 F.2d 1428, amended, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988).
211. Id. at 1439.
212. See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 64 F.3d
261, 266-67 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[It is resolved that, under Bowers v. Hardwick.... and its
progeny, homosexuals did not constitute a 'suspect class' or a 'quasi-suspect' class because
the conductwhich defined them as homosexuals was constitutionally proscribable." (citations
omitted)).
213. 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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equal protection realm.214 In Padula, the plaintiff, a lesbian
applicant for a position as a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
special agent, brought suit against the FBI after she was denied the
position based on her sexual orientation.21 She claimed, among
other things, that the FBI violated her equal protection rights.21
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
rejected Padula's claim that lesbians and gay men constitute a
quasi-suspect or suspect class.217 In holding that the proper
standard was rational basis review, the court stated:
[I]n Hardwick, to be sure, plaintiffs did not rely on the equal
protection clause, but after the Court rejected an extension of
the right to privacy, it responded to plaintiffs alternate
argument that the Georgia law should be struck down as with
rational basis (under the due process clause) .... The Court
summarily rejected that position .... We therefore think the
[Court's] reasoning in Hardwick . . . forecloses appellant's
efforts to gain suspect class status for practicing homosexu-
als. 218
Under this reasoning, the court upheld the FBI's decision.
In Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,219 the plaintiff was a lesbian reserve
sergeant in the United States Army.220 Under its regulations
addressing lesbians and gay men, she was discharged and then
denied reenlistment.221 She challenged the Army regulation on
equal protection grounds.2 2 Relying on Bowers, the Seventh Circuit
held that the rational basis test was the proper one and upheld the
regulation as constitutional.223 The court stated that, "[a]lthough
the [Bower's] Court analyzed the constitutionality of the [Georgia
sodomy] statute in a due process rather than an equal protection
basis, Hardwick nevertheless impacts on the scrutiny aspects under
an equal protection analysis."22 '
214. See id. at 103.
215. See id. at 98.
216. See id.
217. See id, at 104.
218. Id. at 103.
219. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989).
220. See id at 456.
221. See id. at 456-57.
222. See i& at 457.
223. See i& at 464.
224. Id.
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Finally, in Jantz v. Muci, 225 the Tenth Circuit held consistently
with the majority of courts in rejecting suspect classification for
lesbians and gay men.226 The defendant, a state school system,
refused to hire the plaintiff as a teacher and coach based on the
perception that the plaintiff was a gay man.22 7 The court stated
that, although Bowers did not consider an equal protection 1claim,
it did "cast enough shadow on the area [of lesbians and gay men
and equal protection] so that any unlawfulness in [diefendant's
actions was not 'apparent."22  The principal of the school was
immune from the suit.22
As these cases indicate, lesbians and gay men have been
confined by the holding in Bowers much like persons with disabili-
ties have been confined by the holding in Cleburne. Further,just as
the ADA has created new possibilities, although still uncertain
ones, that the non-suspect classification for persons with disabili-
ties may be changing, the Supreme Court's 1996 holding in Romer
v. Evans23 has created similar and exciting opportunities for
lesbians and gay men.
E. Romer v. Evans
In 1996, the Supreme Court decided its first case involving
lesbian and gay issues since Bowers ten years earlier. Romer
involved a Colorado ballot initiative that was successfully passed by
the people of Colorado."' The initiative, known as Amendment 2,
repealed all existing antidiscrimination laws protecting lesbians
and gay men at every level of the state, as well as prohibited any
future action by any state or local government that would protect
on the basis of sexual orientation.232
The Supreme Court struck down Amendment 2 as violative of
the Equal Protection Clause.' In a much-criticized opinion,234 the
225. 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992).
226. See id. at 630.
227. See id. at 625.
228. Id. at 630.
229. See id at 630-31.
230. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
231. See id. at 623.
232. See id at 624.
233. See id. at 623.
234. See generally, e.g., Caren G. Dudnoft Romerv. Evans A Legal and PoliticalAnalysis,
16 LAW & INEQUALITY 275 (1997); Katherine M. Hamill, Romer v. Evans. Dulling the Equal
Protection Gloss on Bowers v. Hardwick, 77 B.U. L. REV. 655 (1997); Joseph S. Jackson,
Persons of Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of Equal Protection, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 453 (1997); William M. Wilson, III, Romer v. Evans: 'Terminal Silliness," or
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majority never mentioned Bowers and purported to apply the
rational basis test. The Court did admit, however, that "Amend-
ment 2 fails, indeed defies, even... conventional [equal protection]
inquiry."2"' The Court found that there was no legitimate state
interest being served by Amendment 2," striking it down using
rational basis review.
Romer has been criticized, as was Cleburne, for purporting to
use the rational basis test, while in reality using a higher level of
judicial scrutiny.2 37 The Romer Court glossed over its choice of
rational basis review and spent the majority of the short opinion
justifying its reasons for finding the governmental interests offered
by the State of Colorado unpersuasive and violative of rational basis
review. The Court also wrote at length about the animus behind
Amendment 2, stating, "[Amendment 2's] sheer breadth is so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment
seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it
affects[;]"238 "laws of the kind before us raise the inevitable infer-
ence that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected." 9 Finally, the Court expressed concern
about the sweeping nature of Amendment 2, which would effec-
tively cut lesbians and gay men out of the political process. The
Court stated,
Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or
may seek without constraint. They can obtain specific protec-
tion against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of
Colorado to amend the state constitution .... This is so no
matter how local or discrete the harm, no matter how public or
widespread the injury.2
As a result, scholars and commentators are uncertain after Romer
about the state of equal protection law in the context of sexual
orientation."'
Enlightened Jurisprudence?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1891 (1997); Baroutjian, supra note 16.
235. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
236. See id.
237. See sources cited supra note 234.
238. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
239. Id. at 634.
240. Id. at 631.
241. See Baroutjian, supra note 16, at 1278.
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F. Federal Laws Impacting Lesbians and Gay Men: DOMA and
ENDA
Like the evolution of protection for persons with disabilities
over the past two decades, many laws forbidding discrimination
based on sexual orientation have been adopted at many leyels of
government, from local ordinances to state-wide laws.2 2 Some
groups of citizens have objected to such laws and organized to
repeal them. " However, a major difference between protection
based on disability and protection based on sexual orientation is
found at the federal level. Whereas a myriad of federal laws have
been enacted with the goal of protecting or serving persons, with
disabilities,2" no federal law has ever been enacted to protect or
provide services for lesbians and gay men.
There has been, however, federal legislation enacted that
harms lesbians and gay men. In 1996 Congress passed, and
President Clinton signed, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).
DOMA defines marriage as "only a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife"2 and defines a spouse as "a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.""' This
legislation precludes lesbians and gay men from claiming the many
societal and legal benefits of the institution of marriage. Further,
DOMA relegates the relationships of lesbians and gay men to an
invisible status. DOMA's purpose, according to a report from the
House of Representatives, is to protect the institution of
marriage.' Further, the House report stated that the two
governmental interests driving the law were defending traditional
notions of marriage and protecting the rights of states to make their
own policy regarding marriage.2' 9 DOMA illustrates the continued
animus toward and fear of lesbians and gay men.
Recently, there have been attempts to enact federal legislation
to protect lesbians and gay men from discrimination. However, in
contrast to the ADA, these legislative attempts have been aimed at
242. See Bruce, supra note 165, at 443-44 (explaining that over the past several decades,
antidiscrimination laws or policies based on sexual orientation have been enacted in 119
localities and at least 20 states).
243. See id. (stating that citizens opposed to legal protection based on sexual orientation
placed ballot initiatives repealing such protections in 38 communities that had enacted such
laws and that the repeal efforts were successful in 34 of the ballot initiatives).
244. See supra Part III.B.
245. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
246. 1&
247. Id.
248. See H.R. REP. No. 104-64, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906.
249. See id.
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providing very narrow protections for lesbians and gay men,
predominantly in employment.
In the 103rd Congress, members introduced the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA).W The most recent attempt to
pass ENDA occurred in the 106th Congress in 1996, where it failed
to pass the Senate by one vote.21' ENDA provides protection in the
workplace for lesbians and gay men, but it is limited in scope and
remedies. ENDA prohibits employers from considering sexual
orientation, real or perceived, in hiring, firing, promotion, and
compensation decisions.252 Further, employers cannot discriminate
against employees based on the sexual orientation of those with
whom the employee associates.2" For example, an employee cannot
be fired because he or she has a lesbian or gay child. ENDA
provides for the same remedies that are available under Title VII
and under the ADA. 2"
Although ENDA is a landmark piece of legislation for lesbian
and gay civil rights, it is notable also for what it does not provide.
Unlike the ADA, ENDA does not permit a disparate impact claim
similar to that available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.255 ENDA also does not require an employer to provide
benefits for the same-sex partner of an employee, does not apply to
the military, does not apply to businesses with fewer than fifteen
employees, prohibits quotas, and is not retroactive.
256
250. See Kenneth A. Kovach & Peter E. Millspaugh, Employment Nondiscrimination Act:
On the Cutting Edge of Public Policy, BUS. HORIZONS, July 17, 1996, at 65, 65 (noting that
ENDA was first introduced in the 103rd Congress; it was introduced in the House as bill
number 4636 and in the Senate as bill number 2238); see also Carolyn Lochhead, Vote Stalled
on Gay Marriages, Democrats Work on Job.Bias Rider, SAN FRANciSCO CHRON., Sept. 5,
1996, at A6 (noting that a version of ENDA was introduced in 1975 by Rep. Bella Abzug but
the bill never reached the Senate floor for debate).
251. See Discrimination: Senate Rejects by 50-49 Bill to Ban Job Bias Based on Sexual
Orientation, EMPLOYMENT POL'Y & L. DAILY (BNA), Sept. 12, 1996, at 11.





256. See id. Although the ADA contains some of the same limitations, such as the
application to small businesses, the ADA is still a far more overarching protective civil rights
law than ENDA will ever be. See id.
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V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERENT PATHS TO PROTECTION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The Equal Protection Clause is an important mechanism to
protect and ensure civil rights in our democracy. The Equal
Protection Clause and the body of law that has grown up around it
illustrate the notion that equal protection is fundamental to our
notions of fairness, citizenship, and justice. As the Court stated in
Romer, "[o] ne century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this
Court that the Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens.' Unheeded then, those words now are understood
to state a commitment to the law's neutrality where the rights of
persons are at stake."257
The Equal Protection Clause is thus an important tool for
persons with disabilities and lesbians and gay men, because both
are groups that have been, and still are to some extent, subject to
intense societal discrimination, exclusion, and vilification. An
important step in securing further civil rights and ending discrimi-
nation would be to elevate these two groups from the non-suspect
classes they currently occupy into the more protected
classes--either quasi-suspect or suspect classes.
A. Is it Possible to Legislate Heightened Scrutiny?
The Boerne case makes it unclear whether Congress can
establish quasi-suspect or suspect classifications through
legislation.25 It is clear from the Boerne holding, however, that
Congress cannot dictate the substantive rights of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for it was on this ground
that the Supreme Court invalidated the RFRA."59
As seen by several ADA cases, some courts interpret Boerne as
prohibiting Congress from legislating suspect classification for
persons with disabilities through the ADA."" Although the
Supreme Court will be the ultimate arbiter of this issue, it seems
that the RFRA in Boerne can be distinguished from Congress's ADA
findings that persons with disabilities are a "discrete and insular
minority." For example, the RFRA purported to apply to all laws,
257. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896)) (citations omitted).
258. See supra text accompanying note 146.
259. See id.
260. See supra notes 154-164 and accompanying text.
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even laws of general application.2 " On the contrary, the ADA's
findings would seem to mandate that only laws specifically
addressing persons with disabilities should trigger suspect
classification.262
The line between creating new rights under Section 5 and
interpreting existing ones is far from clear. Prior to the Boerne
decision, there were several theories for congressional enforcement
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The "ratchet" theory, articulated
inKatzenbach v. Morgan2' by Justice Brennan, is a substantive one
which allows Congress to increase but not decrease Fourteenth
Amendment protections.2 ' The "remedial" theory limits Congress
to enforcing Fourteenth Amendment rights already recognized by
the Supreme Court.26 5 Finally, the "fact-finding theory, interprets
Section 5 as allowing Congress, for reasons of institutional
competence, to identify and invalidate neutral laws that effectuate
an impermissible discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. " 2 "
The Boerne decision rejected the ratchet theory of Morgan and
instead stated that Morgan stood for the fact-finding theory.27 This
dicta in Boerne is important in the context of the ADA because
Congress made such findings when enacting the ADA. The
congressional findings that introduce the ADA state that persons
with disabilities constitute a "discrete and insular minority who
have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position
of political powerlessness." 26 8
The language of "discrete and insular minority" echoes the
language in United States v. Carolene Products.6 9 In Carolene
261. Laws of general applicability are those that are neutral, meaning that they do not
classify among particular groups. See Rotunda, The Powers of Congress, supra note 149, at
178-79. For example, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the case that prompted the RFRA's enactment, the challenged
law banned the use of peyote, an illegal drug. See id. at 874. Although the law was neutral
and one of general applicability, meaning that it applied to everyone regardless of their
religious affiliation, it interfered with the exercise ofreligion of the Native American Church,
whose members used peyote as a sacrament. See id at 903.
262. See, e.g., Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094,1132-34
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting the possible intent of Congress's use of "discrete and insular
minority" in its findings).
263. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
264. See Nonsuspect Classes, supra note 11, at 1542.
265. See id.
266. Id. at 1542-43.
267. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct, 2157, 2167-68 (1997).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
269. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
PATHS TO PROTECTION
Products, Justice Stone included a now-famous footnote in which he
coined the term "discrete and insular minority."270 In that footnote,
Justice Stone wondered "whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."27' This footnote
is credited with initiating the concept of heightened judicial
scrutiny for such minority groups. Thus, Congress's use of this
language was significant-it may suggest that Congress intended
that persons with disabilities be considered a suspect class.
The Boerne decision gives some guidance on how congressional
findings should be evaluated, implying that "the adequacy of
congressional findings may depend on whether Congress exercised
its Section 5 fact-finding or remedial powers. 272 Boerne seems to
suggest that if congressional findings are made pursuant to its fact-
finding power, the Court will look more closely at such findings
than the Court would if the findings were made pursuant to
Congress's remedial power.27 The important inquiry in the context
of the ADA thus becomes whether Congress was exercising its fact-
finding power when it made its findings that persons with
disabilities are a discrete and insular minority.
It is unclear from the legislative history of the ADA whether
Congress was acting under its fact-finding powers when it made its
findings. As the Bartlett court stated:
Several questions arise from Congress' invocation of this
language [of discrete and insular minority:] ... whether
Congress intended to force the courts to subject legislation or
behavior respecting disabled persons to strict scrutiny review or
whether the Congress merely desired to send a message to the
courts that a heightened level of review of the claims of disabled
individuals was appropriate. 74
The same court noted that there does not seem to be any legislative
history directly discussing Congress's choice of the discrete and
insular minority language.2 75 However, the court compared the
270. Id. at 153 n.4.
271. Id.
272. Nonsuspect Clasaes, supra note 11, at 1549.
273. See id. at 1550.
274. Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1132 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
275. See id. at 1133.
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ADA's findings with the RFRA's findings and concluded that
whereas the RFRA expressly declared the level of scrutiny to be
applied to laws implicating religious freedom, the ADA did not
make such a declaration.'" In reference to the ADA's findings; the
court noted that "Congress appears to be utilizing its recognizably
superior fact-finding function, providing to the Court data from
which it hopes the Court will arrive at the conclusion that disabled
persons should be given heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause."277 If this court is correct in its assessment of the
ADA's findings, the ADA will escape Boerne's constrictive holding.
Even if the Court were to hold that Boerne extends to the ADA,
the Court could still find that sexual orientation constitutes a
suspect class, because there is no legislation like the ADA that
purports to define lesbians and gay men as a "discrete and insular
minority." Assuming that the Court finds that Boerne extends to
the ADA, it would send a message to those drafting legislation
aimed at protecting lesbians and gay men that any such findings
will not result in heightened scrutiny. Instead, a presumption that
the Court will hold that Boerne prohibits Congress from defining
suspect classifications requires that advocates for persons with
disabilities and lesbians and gay men find another method of
elevating their constituents' equal protection status-through the
judiciary, which under Boerne is the appropriate institution to
make such determinations. As a result, the Court would have to
overturn both Cleburne and Bowers.
B. Overcoming Case Law To Reach and Surmount Non-Suspect
Class Status
The doctrine of stare decisis requires courts to abide by, and
adhere to, decided cases.27 Stare decisis is essential to the
continued respect for, and legitimacy of, the decisions of the
judiciary. The Supreme Court and every court below it are bound
by this doctrine, and the Supreme Court defers to the doctrine by
seldom overturning its own cases. It is the principle of stare decisis
that led most lower courts to adhere to Bowers and Cleburne in
holding that lesbians and gay men, as well as persons with
disabilities, are non-suspect classes. Therefore, Supreme Court
decisions expressly overturning these two cases, though unlikely,
276. See ia
277. I& at 1134.
278. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 978 (6th ed. 1991).
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seem to be the only way these two groups will ever attain
heightened scrutiny.
An argument may be made, however, that a Supreme Court
holding that lesbians and gay men constitute a suspect class is not
governed by any stare decisis principles. None of the Court's prior
decisions have addressed the issue of the appropriate level of equal
protection scrutiny to be applied to legislation implicating lesbians
and gay men as a class. Even the Court's decision in Romer, hailed
as a victory by many lesbians and gay men,279 though criticized by
many legal scholars,2 0 does not present a stare decisis problem.
Romer did not go so far as to address the issue of suspect
classification squarely, for such an inquiry was deemed unnecessary
to resolve that case. Although it is true that the Court applied
rational basis scrutiny to the amendment in Romer, a subsequent
inference that Romer held that lesbians and gay men do not
constitute a quasi-suspect or suspect class, however, is unfounded.
Romer stated that Amendment 2 "defle[d] even this conventional
[rational basis] inquiry"" and "confound [ed] this normal process of
judicial review."212
The proper reading of Romer, therefore, is that the Court
utilized the rational basis standard of review not because the
targeted group-lesbians and gay men-was undeserving of quasi-
suspect or suspect classification, but because the sweeping nature
of the amendment in that case failed even the most deferential
standard of equal protection review. As a result, the Court did not
need to reach the question of suspect classification for lesbians and
gay men. Similar to the Court's decision in Cleburne, the holding
in Romer has been criticized for injecting power into the rational
basis test283-a test without any vitality before the Cleburne and
Romer decisions. In this way, Romer has shaken equal protection
jurisprudence at its roots by taking the rational basis test, under
which all previous classifications based on sexual orientation were
upheld, and reaching the completely unpredictable result of striking
down the amendment. Such an application of the rational basis
test-in both Cleburne and Romer-left lower courts confused and
without much concrete direction or guidance.2"
279. See Baroutjian, supra note 16, at 1278-79, 1300.
280. See i&
281. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
282. 1d. at 633.
283. See generally Baroutjian, supra note 16, at 1319-30.
284. See id. at 1314; Montannro, supra note 4, at 660-61.
2000] 361
362 WILLIAM& MARYJOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 6:323
In Bowers, the Court merely held that there is no fundamental,
due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to engage in
private, consensual, homosexual sodomy. Due process and equal
protection are distinguishable, and as a result, so too are decisions
regarding those concepts. Historically, the Due Process Clause has
been interpreted to "protect traditionally recognized rights from
state and federal power"285 and, in that regard, the clause "has an
important backward looking dimension." " However, the Equal
Protection Clause protects a different set of purposes in that it "is
emphatically not an effort to protect traditionally held values." 7
Instead, the Equal Protection Clause functions to protect oppressed
groups from past and future discrimination by political
majorities.88 In sum, the Equal Protection Clause is rooted in a
"principle of equality that operates as a criticism of existing
practice. The clause does not safeguard traditions; it protects
against traditions, however long-standing and deeply rooted."289
Thus, an argument exists that Bowers, when confined to its
facts and its holding, does not implicate equal protection in any
way, and thus, there never has been a Supreme Court ruling
addressing the equal protection status of lesbians and gay men.
Since many courts have interpreted Bowers as precluding
heightened scrutiny for lesbians and gay men, 2' however, it is
unlikely that the Court will agree that stare decisis is not triggered.
The Cleburne decision may present more of a challenge to
persons with disabilities than Bowers presents for lesbians and gay
men. For, unlike Bowers, Cleburne decided the issue of the level of
scrutiny that persons with disabilities should be accorded in equal
protection cases; or, if one looks to Cleburne in its narrowest
possible light, the Court decided the issue of the level of scrutiny
285. Cas R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161,1170 (1988).
286. Id. at 1171 (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272
(1855)); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (basing the holding on
references to "tradition," 'history," "ordered liberty," and/or 'fundamental principles");
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (same); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (same); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (same).
287. Sunstein, supra note 285, at 1174.
288. See id.
289. Id. (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982) (relying on the notion of protecting disadvantaged groups against traditions);
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (same); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (same); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (same).
290. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (relying on Bowers to
find the proper equal protection analysis for homosexuality to be rational basis).
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that persons with mental retardation should be accorded in equal
protection cases. In fact, the Court devoted a great deal of the
opinion to its discussion of why persons with disabilities, or at least
persons with mental retardation, are not a suspect class, therefore
creating binding common law which must now be expressly
overturned by the Court.
There may be an argument, however, that courts have
improperly analyzed Cleburne in the same way it has been argued
that courts have improperly analyzed Bowers. Because Cleburne
addressed persons with mental retardation specifically, its
application to all subsequent cases addressing various types of
disabilities is an improper broadening and extension of that
holding. Further, Cleburne held the ordinance at issue
unconstitutional only as applied, as opposed to striking it down
entirely, making the holding even narrower.29' All of these
arguments suggest that Cleburne has been analyzed incorrectly and
thus the Supreme Court could correct this problem while not
overturning Cleburne entirely.
Notwithstanding all of these arguments, lower courts have
considered Cleburne in deciding equal protection claims based on
disability and have considered Bowers in deciding equal protection
claims based on sexual orientation. With respect to sexual
orientation cases, courts have held that homosexuals do not
constitute a quasi-suspect or suspect class and, therefore, have
applied the rational basis test. 2 In addition, many lower courts
have relied on Cleburne in deciding that persons with disabilities do
not constitute a suspect class.293 In order for the Supreme Court to
declare that lesbians and gay men or persons with disabilities do
constitute a quasi-suspect class, the Court would have to state why
its decision does not subvert the doctrine of stare decisis.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,2" the Supreme Court addressed the issue of stare decisis.
In Casey, the Court articulated several factors to consider when
291. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
292. See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d
261, 266 (6th Cir. 1995) (resolving that under Bowers v. Hardwick and its progeny,
homosexuals did not constitute 'a suspect class or a quasi-suspect class[ I because the
conduct which places them in that class is not constitutionally protected); Ben-Shalom v.
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,461,464-65 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); Padulav. Webster, 822 F.2d 97,102,
103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same).
293. See, e.g., Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v. Wingate, 101 F.3d 818,825-27 (2d
Cir. 1996) (relying on Cleburne to apply rational basis to disability); Does 1-5 v. Chandler,
83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); Spragens v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 947, 950 (10th Cir.
1994) (same).
294. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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reexamining a prior holding. The Court described these factors as
a "series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to
test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of
the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and
overruling a prior case."' These considerations include
whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences.
of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation;
whether related principles of law have so far developed as to
have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned
doctrine; or whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen
so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification.'
The response to each of these inquiries reveals that the Court can
hold that lesbians and gay men, as well as persons with disabilities,
are a quasi-suspect or suspect class for equal protection review,
consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis.
1. Whether the Rule Has Proven To Be Intolerable Simply in
Defying Practical Workability
Although often reversed on appeal, some courts have properly
distinguished Bowers from equal protection cases involving lesbians
and gay men and found that this group constitutes a quasi-suspect
or suspect class. 7 Notwithstanding the fact that these disparate
outcomes are not per se evidence that Bowers is "unworkable," they
do reveal a lack of clarity in this area of the law that has
engendered a wide spectrum of decisions.
The decisions in the area of disability have been far more
consistent in their holdings that persons with disability are subject
to rational basis review based on Cleburne, however, the ADA has
created new issues for the Court's review. More specifically, the
ADA's findings that persons with disabilities are a "discrete and
295. Id. at 854.
296. Id. at 854-45 (citations omitted).
297. See, e.g., Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Kan. 1991) (finding homosexuality a
suspect class), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992); Watkins v. United
States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, amended, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (same), affd on different
grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). See generally Sunstein, supra note 285
(distinguishing equal protection doctrine from due process doctrine and arguing that
homosexuals as a class require suspect classification).
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insular minority" have caused confusion in the judiciary regarding
the equal protection status of persons with disabilities."8 '
Further, it could be argued that the ADA's findings directly
address an issue raised by the Cleburne majority. In Cleburne, the
Court noted that although Congress has Section 5 power to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause, "absent controlling congressional
direction, the courts have themselves devised standards for
determining the validity of state legislation... that is challenged
as denying equal protection."2s Its seems that the ADA's finding
that persons with disabilities constitute a discrete and insular
minority, language renowned for triggering heightened scrutiny,
answers the Cleburne Court's request for congressional direction.
Seen from this perspective, Cleburne is unworkable in light of the
ADA findings."
The ADA thus has caused a previously settled area of equal
protection law to become unsettled. Therefore, Supreme Court
decisions holding lesbians and gay men and persons with
disabilities a quasi-suspect or suspect class, to the extent that they
clarify Bowers and Cleburne, are consistent with this aspect of stare
decisis.
2. Whether the Rule is Subject to a Kind of Reliance that
Would Lend a Special Hardship to the Consequences of
Overruling and Add Inequity to the Cost of Repudiation
This prong of stare decisis inquiry is concerned with judicial
consistency. It considers the impact that a change in the rule of law
would have on those who have relied on the existing rule of law.3"1
In the area of sexual orientation law, reliance by lower courts on the
tenuous assertion that Bowers stands for the proposition that
homosexuals do not enjoy heightened scrutiny creates a negative
impact only upon those lesbians and gay men. Further, any effect
of past reliance would be minimal, since such reliance in prior
decisions resulted, for the most part, in injury to lesbians and gay
men.s3 2
State interests offered to justify the continuation of rational
basis review in the analysis of anti-gay legislation are weak and
298. See supra text accompanying notes 150-64.
299. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985).
300. Of course, these findings and their impact on Cleburne or other cases, hinge on how
the Court will interpret them in light of the Boerne decision. See supra Part V.A.
301. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
302. See supra Part IV.D.
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unconvincing. Such interests include the preservation of the
traditional nuclear family, the protection of children, and the
preservation of traditional, Judeo-Christian morality.3" However,
upon closer examination antidiscrimination statutes protecting
lesbians and gay men, or suspect classification for lesbians and gay
men, will not undermine any of these state interests, because such
interests are based on myths and fears about homosexuality.3, As
a result, this aspect of the stare decisis doctrine is satisfied in the
context of sexual orientation and the law.
Similar reasoning applies to the issue of persons with disability
and the law. It is true that in the wake of Cleburne, many courts
have~held that persons with disabilities warrant only rational basis
review. o5 However, like the effects of laws on lesbians and gay
men, the effects of past reliance would be minimal. As stated
above, there have been many positive federal laws passed regarding
disability.' These surely would pass heightened scrutiny. At the
same time, however, there have been other classificatory laws
passed by states or other government actors that have been upheld,
having a negative impact on persons with disabilities."7 With
heightened scrutiny, only these hurtful laws and acts would violate
the equal protection rights of persons with disabilities. As a result,
this aspect of the stare decisis doctrine is satisfied in the context of
disability law.
3. Whether Related Principles of Law Have So Far Developed
as To Have Left the Old Rule No More than a Remnant of
Abandoned Doctrine and Whether Facts Have So Changed, or
Come To Be Seen So Differently, as To Have Robbed the Old Rule
of Significant Application or Justification
In the context of sexual orientation and the law, the "old rule"
is the one articulated in Bowers, namely that the right to engage in
private, consensual, homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution. This prong of the stare decisis
inquiry considers whether an "evolution of legal principle has left
[Bowers's] doctrinal footings weaker than they were in [1986].308
303. See Baehr v. Miike, 23 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) 2001, 2002 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996); JUDITH
STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALuES IN THE POSTMODERN AGE
105-144(1996).
304. See Baehr, 23 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2009-10; STACEY, supra note 303, at 128-144.
306. See cases cited supra note 293.
306. See supra Parts IILB & E.
307. See supra Part III.C.
308. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 605 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
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Legal principles regarding sexual orientation, specifically
homosexuality, have "evolved" in the dozen years since the Court
handed down Bowers. In that time, numerous laws, regulations,
and ordinances have been passed at all levels of government
protecting lesbians and gay men from discrimination. 9 Further,
Romer illustrates the movement this area of legal doctrine has
undergone. Finally, lesbians and gay men have made significant,
although limited, progress in areas of the law, including family law
and employment law.310 All of these shifts in the law should compel
the Court to find that the "old rule" articulated in Bowers is, in fact,
an abandoned doctrine.
In the context of disability and the law, the inquiry into
whether the "evolution of legal principle has left [Cleburne's]
doctrinal footings weaker than they were in [1985]311 produces a
similar conclusion. The ADA is the most important and striking
example of this "evolution." Even a decade ago, such a sweeping
civil rights law for persons with disabilities was unimaginable.
Further, these shifts in the law demonstrate that "facts have
so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the
old rule of significant application or justification."'12 For, the law
often changes in response to shifts in cultural attitudes, or
sometimes precedes such shifts. For example, the era in which the
Court decided Brown v. Board of Education"13 was the beginning of
a fundamental shift in this nation's perception about the place of
African-Americans in American society. The Brown decision
reflected the growing, and now accepted, belief that segregation not
only violated equal protection, but that it represented invidious and
harmful discrimination against African-Americans. Brown
specifically repudiated the holding in Plessy v. Ferguson,31" which
held that racial segregation was not a "badge of inferiority."315
Brown therefore reflected that "[s]ociety's understanding of the
facts upon which a constitutional ruling was sought in 1954 was
309. See Bruce, supra note 165, at 443-44 (explaining that, in the last 20 years, 119
localities have enacted antidiscrimination laws or ordinances based on sexual orientation and
noting that many of these have been repealed in recent years).
310. See id. (discussing the limited gains lesbians and gay men have made in the legal
arena).
311. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
312. I&
313. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
314. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
315. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
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thus fundamentally different from the basis claimed for the decision
in 1896.316
It may be argued that these changes suggest the absence of a
need to raise the level of judicial scrutiny, as reasoned by -the
Cleburne Court. An equally strong argument to the contrary is that
the sweeping changes in the area of sexual orientation have merely
exposed-the oppression and discrimination faced by this group. The
increased visibility of lesbians and gay men in the mainstream of
American life has not resulted in them being embraced and
celebrated by American society. In fact, the opposite has happened
in many cases-the increased visibility and small gains in legal
protections for lesbians and gay men in some communities has
engendered a severe backlash that cries out for heightened judicial
scrutiny. Colorado's Amendment 2 illustrates the severity of the
backlash and the need for suspect classification.31
Another example is the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1997
(HCPA), which seeks to add gender, sexual orientation, and
disability to existing federal hate crime legislation.318 Such
inclusion signals two important messages. First, crimes against
these groups are prevalent. Second, the inclusion of gender signals
that increased protections are not inconsistent with heightened
judicial scrutiny.
Similarly, the facts and understanding surrounding homosexu-
ality have changed from those even a mere thirteen years ago when
the Court considered Bowers. In those years, lesbians and gay men
have "come out of the closet""1 9 in greater numbers than ever
before.32 This increased visibility has led to the destruction of
316. Casey, 606 U.S. at 863.
317. I realize that the Romer Court reached its decision under the rational basis test, at
least in theory. However, many scholars have criticized Romer for applying heightened
scrutiny under the guise of rational basis. Although the Supreme Court successfully
invalidated Amendment 2 under its version of the rational basis test, it is unlikely that lower
courts will begin to strike down anti-gay legislation based on Romer. See, e.g., Equality
Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 295-301 (6th Cir. 1997)
(upholding Issue 3 notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Romer).
318. See H.R. 3081, 105th Cong., lt Seas. (1997).
319. The term "coming out" refers to the public declaration that one is lesbian or gay. See
generally Mark Chekola, Equality Foundation v. City of Cincinnati: Invisibility and
Identifiability of Oppressed Groups, 6 LAw & SEx 141, 149-151 (1996) (explaining the role
that the "closet plays in the struggle for lesbian and gay legal rights); John D'Emilio,
Capitalism and Gay Identity, in THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983)
(describing the history of the lesbian and gay community in the United States).
320. See generally Jackson, supra note 234 (noting that the lesbian and gay rights
movement has encouraged increased visibility of lesbians and gay men, including the
creation of more opportunities for lesbians and gay men to reveal their sexual orientation
publicly).
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many of the myths and fears society held against homosexuality.
For example, it has been proven that, contrary to the perception of
many in the era of Bowers, and even the perception of some people
today, that children of lesbians and gay men are no more likely to
be gay themselves than children raised by heterosexual couples.3 2'
Outside of the law, but also connected to the law, persons with
disabilities have become more visible in the mainstream of society.
For example, persons with disabilities now regularly appear on
television programming, news, and commercials with tno fan-
fare-they simply appear as part of the plot, as the anchor of the
news, or as the customer in a commercial. They are seen as people
first, with their disability a secondary characteristic; in the past,
the disability would have been the primary characteristic, erasing
the rest of the person. 2' The ADA has created opportunities for
non-disabled persons to interact with persons with disabilities to an
extent never experienced before its passage. In this way, many
persons with disabilities have been able to "come out of the closet"
and reveal their disability in a way analogous to lesbians and gay
men "coming out of the closet" and revealing their sexual orienta-
tion.' As a result, myths and stereotypes regarding persons with
disabilities, though not eradicated, have been improved to a great
extent.32'
Such emancipation, and subsequent legislative protections,
however, does not imply that persons with disabilities no longer
need heightened scrutiny, as reasoned in Cleburne.325 Such
reasoning is flawed because
this formulation would work to the disadvantage of groups in
our society. Once the legislature succeeds in its efforts to
321. See generally David K Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions,
Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 345 (1994) (noting that children of lesbians
and gay men are no more likely to be gay themselves than children raised by heterosexual
partners).
322. See Jonathon C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the
Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L.
REV. 1341, 1358-59 (1993) (noting that cultural attitudes with regard to persons with
disabilities have shifted over the last 20 years).
323. See, e.g., Paul Steven Miller, The Americans with Disabilities Act in Texas: The
EEOC's Continuing Efforts in Enforcement, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 789 (discussing a story
shown on 20/20, a nationally televised news magazine, about persons who do not have
'traditional" disabilities); see also Drimmer, supra note 322, at 1407 (stating that persons
with disabilities must *continue to 'come out of the closet' and affirm themselves as equal
citizens deserving equal righte (emphasis added)).
324. See Drimmer, supra note 322, at 1408 (noting that "[oinly recently has the disabled
culture begun to be explored").
325. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985).
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provide protective legislation for a particular group, that group
would then be in danger of receiving less judicial protection.
For example, if the Cleburne Court's reasoning was followed,
African Americans and women would lose their special judicial
protection solely because they gained the attention of the
legislature.... The branches of government should share the
function of protecting disadvantaged groups in our society, not
rescind their effort once another branch has contributed to
those protections.3 .
There are, however, some distinct differences between society's
perception of disability and sexual orientation. Persons with
disabilities have gone from being viewed as "other," lacking feelings,
lacking humanity, and in need of segregation, institutionalization,
and even mistreatment to being viewed as full, important, and
meaningful members of society. Although societal fears of and
discrimination against persons with disabilities continue, these
attitudes and actions are increasingly frowned upon and corrected,
both in the law and in the mainstream of society. People are
coming to see that these attitudes are wrong, to the extent that
Congress proscribed the manifestation of these attitudes through
the ADA. In fact, discrimination against and negative attitudes
toward persons with disabilities are beginning to be viewed as
egregious as discrimination against and fear of persons of color and
women.
This is not the case for sexual orientation. Whereas society's
perception and treatment of persons with disabilities has improved,
the same is not true of society's, and the law's, perception and
treatment of lesbians and gay men. Notwithstanding, or perhaps
because of, the passage of dozens of civil rights laws and ordinances
protecting lesbians and gay men, a serious and even violent
backlash has emerged against this group. In many sectors of
American society, including the United States Congress,37 it is
acceptable and even applauded to discriminate against and vilify
lesbians and gay men. Stereotypes abound about the nature of
lesbians as man-hating feminists out to destroy the institution of
the family.32 Similar stereotypes exist regarding gay men as
326. Montanaro, supra note 4, at 662.
327. See, e.g., DOMA, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996) (making same-sex marriage illegal).
328. See, e.g., Larry Cat& Backer, Expoaing the Perversions of Toleration: The Decrimina-
lization of Private Sexual Conduct, the Model Penal Code, and the Oxymoron of Liberal
Toleration, 46 FLA. L. REv. 755, 791 (1993) (recognizing the "power of dominant culture to
impose on lesbians the images of'predatory, possessive, promiscuous,jealous, sadistic, maso-
chistic, unhealthy, bitter, man-hating, masculine, aggressive, frustrated, over-sexed' people").
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pedophiles, as the cause of AIDS, and as a threat to masculinity
and thus to the continued dominance of patriarchy.3
Many of these attitudes are based on notions of morality.
Opponents of homosexuality, and thus of laws protecting lesbians
and gay men, base many of their views and arguments on a belief
that homosexuality is morally and religiously wrong, corrupt, and
evil."0 It is this conceptualization of homosexuality as immoral and
corrupt on which many of the laws criminalizing homosexual
conduct and denying lesbians and gay men certain rights and
opportunities, such as marriage, child-rearing, and employment,
are based. A synonymous vilification of persons with disabilities,
based on notions of morality, does not exist to the same extent it
does against lesbians and gay men.
This important difference leads to a conclusion that the proper
result is the classification of lesbians and gay men as a suspect
class and the classification of persons with disabilities as a quasi-
suspect class.81  As stated by the Supreme Court, there are
inevitably reasons for classifications in legislation. There are real
and valid circumstances that would lead legislators to classify based
on disability, because it is undisputed that some disabilities, such
as mental retardation, limit persons with disabilities in ways that
would make classifications legitimate. However, legislation based
on sexual orientation is not based on any real limitation, but
instead reflects a legislating of morality, often expressed as pure
animus. There is never any reason to classify on the basis of sexual
orientation; however, because hatred and violence toward lesbians
and gay men is still prominent, legislators at all levels of local,
state, and federal governments continue to enact discriminatory
laws against lesbians and gay men. Only suspect classification will
protect lesbians and gay men. On the contrary, because there are
legitimate reasons for classifying based on disability, quasi-suspect
classification will protect persons with disabilities.
329. See, e.g., Lynne Henderson, Without Narrative: Child Sexual Abuse, 4 VA. J. SOC.
POLY & L. 479, 490 (1997) (Part of the stereotype contained in homophobia, for example, is
that gay men are pedophiles .... ")
330. See Larry Cat& Backer, Constructing "Homosexual" for the Constitutional Theory:
Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence and Antipathy in the United States and British Courts, 71
TUL. L. REv. 529, 543-44 (1996).
331. See generally Montanaro, supra note 4.
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C. Determining Quasi-Suspect Classification for Persons with
Disabilities and Suspect Classification for Lesbians and Gay Men
The Supreme Court considers several factors when determining
whether a group should be considered as a quasi-suspect or suspect
class. These factors include: whether the group's defining charac-
teristic is immutable,= whether the group has suffered a history of
discrimination, 3 whether the group is in a position of political
powerlessness,' whether the group's defining characteristic relates
in any way to its members' ability to participate in, or contribute to,
society,335 and whether the characteristic is beyond the control of
the individual group member.' None of these factors are disposi-
tive, and all are considered in such a determination.
1. Immutability of Sexual Orientation and Disability337
As to the defining characteristics of homosexuality, the District
Court in Equality Foundation I found that "[slexual orientation is
a characteristic which exists separately and independently from
sexual conduct or behavior.' s The District Court further found
that lesbians and gay men constitute between five percent and
thirteen percent of the population' and that sexual orientation is
a "deeply rooted, complex combination of factors including a
predisposition towards affiliation, affection, or bonding with
members of the opposite and/or same gender."' Although lesbians
and gay men come in all colors and stripes, and occupy all walks of
life, there is a defining characteristic that unites them into a
332. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (finding immutability as
a factor in determining the proper level of scrutiny). But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,442-43 n. 10 (1985) (revealing some hesitancy about applying the
immutability factor).
333. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 313 (1976); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-85;
334. See San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
335. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-44; Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976);
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 310-11; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
336. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (citing Lucas, 427 U.S. at 505); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 217 n.14 (1982); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
337. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. Although the Court has revealed some hesitancy
about applying this particular factor, see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-43 n.10, it is important
to address it in the context of homosexuality, given the fierce public debate about the role of
biology and genetics in sexual orientation and identity.





suspect group. Dr. John Gonsiorek, one of the petitioner's expert
witnesses in Equality Foundation I, noted that sexual orientation
is characterized by "a predisposition towards erotic, sexual,
affiliation or affection relationship towards one's own and/or other
gender." " Finally, although the specific roots of sexual orientation
are not fully known, experts agree that, once established, sexual
orientation is very difficult to alter.'"2
Similarly, disability is, for the most part, immutable. In
passing the ADA, Congress found that forty-three million Ameri-
cans have "one or more physical or mental disabilities."' Many
persons with disabilities are born with such disabilities. Others
acquire disabilities later in life due to an illness or accident; many
such disabilities are permanent or long-term. Some disabilities,
however, are not permanent. Additionally, some disabilities can be
mitigated or treated in ways that diminish or make invisible the
disability. Although the ADA does not take into account
mitigation,3' the fact that it includes a requirement for "reasonable
accommodation"' 5 suggests that disability is not always immutable,
or if it is, it can be accommodated in a way that makes it a non-
issue for employment or other purposes. In contrast, homosexuality
never changes,' and no accommodation will ever engender such a
change.
A further distinction lies in the definition of these two groups.
Whereas the definition of sexual orientation generally, and
homosexuality specifically, is quite narrow," ' the definition of
disability in the ADA is quite broad.' The narrow nature of the
definition of homosexuality produces the result that the same
341. Id. at 437.
342. See id.; see also Heightened Scrutiny, supra note 176, at 818-20 (discussing research
that indicates that sexual orientation develops early in life, usually by a person's fifth or
sixth birthday, and that "[s]exual orientation is generally impervious to change").
343. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(aX1) (1999).
344. But see Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that a determination
of impairment under the ADA should be made only after mitigating or corrective measures
that may diminish such impairment have been effected); Kirkingburgv. Albertson's, Inc., 143
F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that, although the plaintiffs brain made corrections of his
visual impairment to, in essence, mitigate his disability, he was still disabled under the
ADA), reu'd, 627 U.S. 655 (1999).
345. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1999).
346. Although some claim that homosexuality can be "cured," the weight of authority
suggests that this positions is incorrect and based on religion and morality. See, e.g., Backer,
supra note 330, at 656 n.82 (noting the "modern religious version of the notion that
homosexuality can be 'cured').
347. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,437
(S.D. Ohio 1994).
348. See infra text accompanying note 349.
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group, consisting of the same individuals, are always burdened by
laws implicating homosexuality, and because these laws are based
on animus and stereotype, this narrow class demands suspect
classification.
The ADA defines a disability with respect to an individual as
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such
an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impair-
ment."3' 9 The breadth of this definition results in a great number
of persons with varying levels, types, and degrees of disability being
included in any class of persons with disabilities in an equal
protection review. Because there are so many types and degrees of
disability, more deference to the legislature is warranted; thus
quasi-suspect classification is appropriate.
2. Political Powerlessness of Lesbians and Gay Men and
Persons with Disabilities
Lesbians and gay men are, in many regards, politically
powerless.se Justice Brennan's dissent from the denial of certiorari
in Rowland v. Mad River Local School District51 is instructive.
Even in 1985, two members of the Court352 believed that, "[b]ecause
of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested against
homosexuals once so identified publicly, members of this group are
particularly powerless to pursue their rights openly in the political
arena."
=
Fear, hatred, and discrimination aimed at homosexuals makes
coalition-building, an often essential element to passing legislation,
difficult if not impossible .3" The court in Equality Foundation I
noted that "undisputed evidence was offered demonstrating that
gays, lesbians and bisexuals are confronted with distinct obstacles
in the political arena."35 The court further noted that witnesses for
both parties testified that it is "crucial for political minorities to
349. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C).
350. See Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 425, 437-39; see also Richard Lacayo, The
New Struggle: The Wyoming Lynching Is Enraging, But It Hides a Deeper Truth; Gay Life,
and Gay Politics, Has Changed, TIME, Oct. 26, 1998, at 32,32-36 (noting that, even after 25
years in existence, the most prominent gay-rights organization in the United States has
"virtually no lobbying presence in Capitol Hill").
351. 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
352. Justice Marshall joined in this dissent. See id. at 1014 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
353. Id. at 1014 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
354. See Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 426, 437-39.
355. Id, at 438.
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form coalitions in order to achieve legislative success.... Evidence
revealed that even those groups that need the help of gays, lesbians
and bisexuals refuse to form coalitions with them because of their
strong feeling of dislike for these groups."3
The number of openly gay legislators is also indicative of the
lack of political power held by lesbians and gay men as a group.
The court in Equity Foundation I found that of the 497,155 elected
officials in the United States, only seventy-three were openly gay;
none of the United State senators were openly gay; only two
members of the United States House of Representatives were
openly gay; and only twelve of the 7,461 state legislators were
openly gay.35
7
Finally, the recent national trend in passing anti-gay ballot
initiatives indicates that, even though lesbians and gay men are
occasionally able to win the passage of protective legislation, those
protections are often short-lived. For example, the Equality
Foundation I court noted that, of the thirty-eight anti-gay ballot
initiatives that recently emerged around the country, voters
approved thirty-four.5 The court concluded that the success of
these anti-gay initiatives reveals "hostility towards gays, [as well
as] the fact that whatever political gains they have made are in
peril. Thus, whatever bona fide legislative victories gays, lesbians
and bisexual[s] may have achieved in recent years, those victories
are being 'rolled back' at an unprecedented rate and in an unprece-
dented manner."- 9
Persons with disabilities, though not an all-powerful lobby on
Capitol Hill, nonetheless have more political clout than lesbians
and gay men.' Legislators often see the plight of persons with
disabilities as a sensitive and politically wise topic to address and
356. Id.; see also Lacayo, supra note 350. Lacayo notes that:
Largely because of opposition from unions, blacks and church groups, it
was not until 1983 that a gay organization, the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force, was admitted to the Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights, one of Washington's most liberal legislative coalitions. It was 11
years more before the group took a consensus position on anything
involving gay rights.
id.
357. See Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 439 n.20.
358. See id. at 439.
359. Id See generally Bruce, supra note 165 (describing the lack of political power held
by lesbians and gay men as a group).
360. See, e.g., Shawn M. Filippi& Edward J. Reeves, Equality orFurtherDiscriminationF:
Sexual Orientation Nondiscrimination in Oregon Statutory Employment Law After Tanner
v. OHSU, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 269,275 (1999) ([Sexual orientation is one of the
last bastions of 'safe' discrimination in our society.*).
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support. Several of the members of Congress who supported the
ADA had family members with disabilities.3 1 The sheer numbers
of federal laws protecting persons with disabilities illustrate that
they hold some political power, or have an impact on, and a voice
with, those who hold political power. On the contrary, legislators
often shy away from, or expressly distance themselves from and
vote against, legislation protecting lesbians and gay men. 2
3. Ability of Lesbians and Gay Men and Persons with Dis-
abilities to Perform, Participate in, or Contribute to Society
The Equality Foundation I court concluded that "sexual
orientation, whether heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual, bears
no relation whatsoever to an individual's ability to perform, or to
participate in, or contribute to, society. " ss The court relied, in part,
on the American Psychological Association's assertion of this fact in
reaching its conclusion. 4 The lack of a near consensus on this
position reveals that legislation singling out lesbians and gay men
is rooted in prejudice and stereotype, rather than based on fact.36
As the court in Equality Foundation I so accurately stated, "[ilf
homosexuals were afflicted with some sort of impediment to their
ability to perform and contribute to society, the entire phenomenon
of 'staying in the Closet' and 'coming out' would not exist; their
impediment would betray their status."S
361. See JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE wrri DISABuzrIES FORGING A NEw CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 117-18 (1993) (stating that Rep. Cheliho, an ADA sponsor, had epilepsy,
Rep. Weicker's son had Down Syndrome, Rep. Hoyer's wife had epilepsy, Sen. Harkin's
brother was deaf, Sen. Kennedy's son had a leg amputated due to cancer, Sen. Dole's arm
was paralyzed, and President Bush had a daughter who died of leukemia, a son who had
colon cancer, and an uncle who had polio).
362. The plight of persons with disabilities is seen as more sympathetic by lawmakers
than the plight of lesbians and gay men, as reflected in the differing impact each of these
communities has in their lobbying and protesting efforts. Shapiro notes that "[miany
disability activists were envious of the public fascination with the gay rights movement," and
that during the passage of the ADA, ACT-UP, a gay, AIDS activist organization received
front-page coverage on a national news weekly. SHAPIRO, supra note 361, at 136. It is ironic
that the more visible group-lesbians and gay men-receives fewer protections. This lower
level of protection illustrates the role that morality and religion play in legislating
protections. As one disability activist stated, "[a]lthough the gay rights movement was far
more visible, more cohesive, and much more in the public conscience, gays and lesbians in
the 1990s could only dream of the type of national antidiscrimination legislation that was
moving quickly through Congress for disabled people." Id. at 137.
363. Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 437.
364. See id.
365. See Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, amended, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.
1988), affd on different grounds, 876 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
366. Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 437.
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Although scores of persons with disabilities can, and do,
perform, participate in, and/or contribute to society, there is a
subset of persons with disabilities who are so incapacitated by their
disability that they cannot."6 7 As a result, there are some circum-
stances in which legislation could legitimately classify on the basis
of disability, making quasi-suspect classification appropriate.
4. Involuntary Nature of Disability and Sexual Orientation
Finally, the sexual orientation of lesbians and gay men, like the
sexual orientation of heterosexuals, is beyond their control; lesbians
and gay men do not choose to be homosexual."' On the contrary,
sexual orientation, whether heterosexual or homosexual, is "set in
at a very early age-3 to 5 years-and is not only involuntary, but
is unamenable to change.' 3 9
Like sexual orientation, most disabilities are immutable. Many
develop prior to birth and continue throughout a person's life. Those
disabilities that emerge through illness or accident later in life are
also often immutable after onset. However, some disabilities are
temporary, and thus, some level of legislative discretion in classify-
ing on the basis of disability is permissible.
This discussion has focused on overcoming the challenge of
stare decisis for Bowers and Cleburne. Implicit in this discussion
is the notion that the Supreme Court would overturn these prior
decisions on substantive grounds, as opposed to overturning the
prior ruling as a judicially derived interpretive test. This distinction
is important, for overruling a prior judicial test may be seen as not
as sweeping, and therefore not as improper, as overturning a prior
substantive decision. Within this framework, the Court also would
probably consider whether the history of post-Bowers and post-
Cleburne protections for these groups indicates that heightened
scrutiny is unnecessary. This history would show that protections
based on sexual orientation are inconsistent and that many anti-
gay laws still stand today because of the non-suspect nature of that
class, notwithstanding Romer. The history would show that
protections based on disability are also inconsistent in equal
367. Many, including the author, would argue that all persons, regardless of disability,
perform, participate in, and contribute to society by their mere presence in the lives of their
friends and loved ones. However, such an argument is unlikely to persuade a court in an
equal protection review.
368. See Heightened Scrutiny, supra note 176, at 818-19.
369. Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 426.
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protection cases,370 notwithstanding new statutory protections
under the ADA. On these grounds, overruling the judicial test
employed (rational basis) as opposed to overruling the substance of
the decisions (striking down the Cleburne ordinance as applied and
upholding Georgia's sodomy statute) may be appropriate and more
palatable to the current Court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sexual orientation should receive suspect classification,
whereas disability should receive quasi-suspect classification.
Suspect classification for lesbians and gay men will ensure that
almost all legislation discriminating against lesbians and gay men
will be struck down. Further, suspect classification will place
lesbians and gay men on the same scrutiny level as race, alienage,
and national origin vis-&-vis legislation. However, "establishing a
bright-line rule that all statutes classifying based on disability are
to be strictly scrutinized may harm the disabled more than it would
help them because benign, remedial statutes designed to aid the
disabled, when strictly scrutinized, may be struck down.n371 Quasi-
suspect classification would place disability on the same scrutiny
level as gender, in which some remedial statutes are permissible.
The results attained by classifying lesbians and gay men as suspect
and persons with disabilities as quasi-suspect will thus reflect
society's, and the Court's, commitment to eradicating inequality and
achieving justice for both of these groups.
Although the arguments for creating these new quasi-suspect
and suspect classes are reasoned and reflect an accurate reading of
case law, statutory law, and rules of judicial interpretation, one
must also consider whether the current Court will accept such
arguments. The current Court is unlikely to create these new
classifications for lesbians and gay men and persons with disabili-
ties. Since Cleburne, the Court lost three of its most liberal
justices-Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall. Further, since
Cleburne the Court has become more conservative, heralding
judicial restraint.72
370. Compare J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding a
violation of equal protection based on disability), with Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law
Exam'rs, 970 F. Supp 1094, 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding no violation of equal protection
based on disability).
371. Montanaro, supra note 4, at 676 (citation omitted).
372. See Joan Biskupic, New Justices MayShiftSuprene Court Balance on PendingRacial
Issues, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1995, at Al; Ana Puga, Top Court Stays a Cautious Course,
Observers Say, BOSTON GLOBE, May 23, 1994, at 1.
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The Court's possible, perhaps even probable, rejection of
heightened scrutiny for lesbians and gay men and persons with
disabilities has drastically different impacts on the two communi-
ties. If the Court rejects heightened scrutiny for persons with
disabilities, the ADA will remain as a comprehensive civil rights
law that covers most areas of discrimination against persons with
disabilities in American society. In contrast, if the Court rejects
strict scrutiny for lesbians and gay men, this group is left with no
federal protection against discrimination, and with only a patch-
work of state and local protections that vary widely from state to
state and community to community. Thus, lesbians and gay men
and their advocates should focus on a federal antidiscrimination bill
similar to the ADA that would provide sweeping protections against
discrimination based on sexual orientation."37
373. The pursuit of an ADA-like law for lesbians and gay men, although prudent, is likely
to meet many of the same challenges that the struggle for strict scrutiny will meet, namely
conservatism of Congress and rampant homophobia. Thus, the probability of such a bill
passing is low. However, such efforts, coupled with efforts to win strict scrutiny, increase the
chance that lesbians and gay men will receive the protections they deserve.
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